The judgment establishes the binding nature of interlocutory orders, the impact of statutory changes on parties' rights, and the justification for the appellate court's interference with the trial court's order.

JUDGMENT :

1. Heard the learned senior counsel and other counsel for the parties. Rule. Rule returnable forthwith with the consent of the learned counsel appearing for the parties.

Introduction:

2. In a suit for a permanent injunction, the plaintiffs fail to get an interim injunction. But they succeed in the Miscellaneous Civil Appeal. So one of the defendants has filed this writ petition. It assails the appellate order on the grounds that it has interfered with the trial Court's judicious exercise of discretion. The respondents 1 to 3, that is the plaintiffs, argue that they have established all the three cardinal principles to earn injunction, but the trial Court has erred on that count. So the Appellate Court has corrected the mistake; it has merely preserved the disputed commodity pending the litigation.

3. Who should this equitable remedy favour? After all, can this Court interfere with an Appellate Court’s order on the premise that it views the matter in a different light—even in a better light?

Facts:

4. The first three respondents are the plaintiffs in Commercial Suit No.23 of 2020 before the Commercial Court, North Goa, at Panaji; they all are private limited companies. The writ petitioner is the second defendant; the fourth respondent, a partnership firm, is the first defendant; and the fifth respondent, a Government Official or Department, is the third defendant. As the adjudication is about an interlocutory order in a pending suit, I will refer to the parties as they have been arrayed before the trial Court.

5. The second defendant—that is, the petitioner in this writ petition —is said to be a company incorporated in 1901 under the Portuguese law. As it has not been registered under the Indian laws, its status is disputed. The plaintiffs contend that the defendants 1 and 2 are the same. But they have shown them as two entities to avoid confusion and to ward off technical challenges. We need not labour on that point.

6. In the Suit, the plaintiffs have sought a permanent injunction to restrain “the defendant nos.1 & 2 … from transporting the iron ore … from the said mine and/or interfering with the iron ore … at Santonachi Upri Iron Ore Mine bearing TC No.34/1955 in Dabal Village, Sanguem Taluka”. They have also sought a permanent injunction to restrain the third defendant “from entertaining and/or processing any application for transportation of ore/payment of royalty in respect of iron ore/subgrade mineral rejects/dumps/stalks... .” The other consequential reliefs the plaintiffs have sought are not relevant for our purpose.

7. To contextualize the case, we need to set out the facts ever so briefly. The case has two distinct phases: developments up to 2019 and developments in 2020. Though the Suit focuses on the developments in 2020, to appreciate those developments, we need to touch upon the earlier developments as well.

(a) The Background:

8. In 1955, the erstwhile Portuguese Government granted mining concession to one Gajanan Pandurang Shet Parkar. Through an order, dated 28.02.1958, the Government of Goa transferred that mining concession to the second defendant, which was incorporated in 1901.

9. Initially, the second defendant had an agreement with two companies for the extraction and sale of the iron ore. But in 1983 that agreement seemed to have ended. Then, in March 1983, the second defendant—that is, the original concessionaire—entered into “the principal agreement” with Sharad Chandra Zarapkar and Anil Salgaocar.

10. Later, in April 1986, the first defendant contracted with the first plaintiff. Through that agreement, it has appointed the first plaintiff as the sole contractor for extraction and transportation of iron ore from its leased mine. It was initially for 10 years, extendable at the first plaintiff ’s option for “over four periods of five years each on the same terms and conditions”—20 more years.

11. Similarly, the first defendant contracted with the second plaintiff. Through that agreement, the second p