SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

2021 Supreme(Bom) 209

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
S.C. GUPTE, SURENDRA P. TAVADE, JJ.
Shrikrishna Bhikaji Bondge – Appellant
Versus
State of Maharashtra and Others – Respondents
Writ Petition No. 3525 of 2019
Decided On : 19-01-2021

Statutes are prima facie prospective unless expressly made retrospective, and retrospective operation is not intended unless manifested by express words or necessary implication.

Headnote:

GR - Appointment Dispute - 25.11.2005, 06.02.2009, 13.03.2009, 10.11.2009, 10.06.2010, 12.02.2015 - The court discussed the applicability of various Government Resolutions (GRs) in the appointment dispute, emphasizing that the GRs subsequent to the petitioner's appointment were not applicable to his case. The court highlighted the legal principle that statutes are prima facie prospective unless expressly made retrospective, and that retrospective operation is not intended unless manifested by express words or necessary implication.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner sought to quash an order rejecting his appointment as a peon and to obtain approval for his appointment and salary since 1 July 2009. The respondent contended that the petitioner's appointment was not eligible due to surplus staff and subsequent GRs.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the respondent's rejection of the petitioner's appointment was not valid as there was no surplus staff to justify the rejection. The court held that the subsequent GRs were not applicable to the petitioner's case and quashed the impugned order, directing the respondent to approve the petitioner's appointment and release his salary with benefits.

Issues: The issues involved the validity of the rejection of the petitioner's appointment based on surplus staff and the applicability of subsequent GRs to the petitioner's case.

Ratio Decidendi: The court's decision was based on the lack of surplus staff to justify the rejection and the inapplicability of subsequent GRs to the petitioner's case, emphasizing the legal principle that statutes are prima facie prospective unless expressly made retrospective.

Final Decision: The impugned order was quashed and set aside, and the respondent was directed to approve the petitioner's appointment as peon since 1 July 2009 and release his salary with benefits.

JUDGMENT :

SURENDRA P. TAVADE, J.

1. Rule.

2. Rule made returnable forthwith by consent of parties. The petition is heard finally.

3. The Petitioner is seeking relief that the impugned order passed by Respondent No. 2 dated 09 July 2018 be quashed and set aside and to grant approval to his appointment as a peon on the establishment of Respondent No. 4 since date of his appointment i.e. on 1 July 2009. He also claims salary in grant in aid since date of his appointment.

4. Respondent No. 3 is an educational institute registered under the provision of Maharashtra Public Trust Act, 1950. On 4 May 2009 Respondent No. 3 issued advertisement in daily newspaper for filling up the post of peon in the establishment of Respondent No. 4, which is the school run by Respondent No. 3. The Petitioner applied for the post of peon. After complying the procedure, he was appointed as a peon with effect from 1 July 2009. Respondent No. 4 submitted proposal seeking approval to the appointment of the Petitioner to Respondent No. 2 on 19 September 2009. Respondent No. 2 replied to the said communication and directed that the Petitioner should submit his application for approval in individual camp. On 3 March 2010 in pursuance of the direction of Respondent No. 2, the Petitioner submitted fresh proposal for approval to Respondent No. 2 in the individual camp. In turn Respondent No. 2 informed the Petitioner that, although the Government Resolution (for short “GR” of 2009) permits to make appointment as per staffing pattern contemplated in GR of 2005, however, certain persons working in other schools in the district are likely to be declared surplus and approval of the Petitioner was not granted. Since the aforesaid communication dated 6 March 2009, surplus employee was not sent to be absorbed for the post of peon in the establishment of Respondent No. 4. No surplus teacher was there, the said fact is not denied by Respondent Nos. 1 and 2.

5. It is contended that the GR dated 12 February 2015 and 23 October 2013 are not applicable to the facts of the present case. Those GRs are not having retrospective effect. Respondent No. 2 has not provided surplus staff in place of the Petitioner, therefore, the action of Respondent No. 2 is not legal and valid. Hence, the Petitioner fled the present petition.

6. Respondent No. 2 appeared and fled affidavit-in-reply through Bhimrao D. Tonape, Deputy Education Officer (Secondary), Zilla Parishad Kolhapur. It is contended that the present petition is misconceived and hopelessly bared by limitation. It is contended that Respondent No. 3 and 4 had submitted proposal dated 3 March 2010 for approval of appointment of the Petitioner as a peon. The said proposal was rejected by Respondent No. 2 on the ground that there was availability of surplus post in Kolhapur district. The said order was never challenged by Respondent Nos. 3 and 4. Therefore, the Petitioner cannot make fresh application for grant of approval. It is contended that following GRs are relevant for the purpose of deciding validity of Order dated 6 March 2010 as well as Order dated 9 July 2018:-

(a)

25.11.2005

Exhibit-1

(b)

06.02.2009

Exhibit-2

(c)

13.03.2009

Exhibit-3

(d)

10.11.2009

Exhibit-4

(e)

10.06.2010

Exhibit-5

(f)

12.02.2015

Exhibit-6

7. It is contended that by aforesaid GRs, the Petitioner was not eligible for appointment of peon on the ground that there was excess number of peons in respect of school run by Respondent No. 4 as per the GR dated 25 November 2005. No permission was sought for giving advertisement dated 4 May 2009 for the appointment of peon by Respondent Nos. 3 and 4. Hence, it is prayed that the writ petition be dismissed with costs.

8. Heard learned counsel on behalf of the Petitioner and learned counsel for Respondent No. 2. It is the case of the Petitioner that he was appointed as a peo

Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Judicial Analysis

AI

SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon Back to top