The main legal point established in the judgment is that the justifiability of a lock-out cannot be decided under Item 9 of Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971.

JUDGMENT :

R.J. Kochar, J.—The petitioner union is aggrieved by the judgment and order dated January 8, 1993 passed by the Industrial Court, Thane in Complaint ULP No. 213 of 1984. The complaint was filed by the petitioner union against the respondents alleging unfair labour practice under Item 6 of Schedule II and also Items 9 and 10 of Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971. The nub of the complaint filed by the petitioner can be very briefly stated. The petitioner had sought relief against the action of the company resorting to suspension of work w.e.f. June 1, 1984 and subsequently effecting lock-out w.e.f. June 18, 1984. According to the petitioner union, the aforesaid notice of suspension of work and lock-out which commenced on June 18, 1984 was an unfair labour practice as contemplated under Item 6 of Schedule II of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). It also amounted to an unfair labour practice under Items 9 and 10 of Schedule IV of the Act. The petitioner union sought declaration from the Industrial Court to that effect and also sought consequential reliefs of full wages for the entire period of suspension of work and lock-out w.e.f. June 1, 1984 to February 18, 1985. It is an admitted position that the lock-out was lifted on and from February 18, 1985.

2. The respondents appeared before the Industrial Court and filed their written statement to contest the complaint of unfair labour practice. According to the respondents, there was no case made out against them in respect of the alleged unfair labour practice. The respondents contended that they had lawfully resorted to the action of suspension of work and lock-out w.e.f. June 18, 1984. According to the respondents, the lock-out was strictly in accordance with law as provided u/s 24(2) and Section 25(2) of the Act. The respondents had further stated that the lock-out was under the aforesaid provisions strictly in accordance with law and there is no question of lock-out being illegal or being unfair labour practice. The respondents have pointed out in their notice the reasons for such extreme step of lock-out. According to the respondent company, there was no illegality indulged in by it in resorting to the lock-out w.e.f. June 18, 1984 by notice dated June 1, 1984. It is clarified that on June 1, 1984, the respondent company had displayed the notice. Once notice was for suspension of work of production with immediate effect while the other notice was proposing and continuing the lock-out w. e.f. June 18, 1984. The respondents have stoutly defended their action of lock-out being in accordance with law in respect of compliance with all the rules and regulations and prescribed format of a lock-out notice.

3. During the pendency of the complaint there were certain interlocutory proceedings which were initiated by the parties. There were certain orders passed by this Court also. As I am disposing of the writ petition against the final judgment and order of the Industrial Court, I am avoiding to mention in detail the contents of the aforesaid interlocutory proceedings.

4. On the basis of the pleadings, the Industrial Court framed six points for determination. The petitioner union adduced oral evidence. The respondent company did not adduce any oral evidence. Both the parties, however, adduced and relied upon documentary evidence in support of their contentions. The Industrial Court answered all the issues against the petitioner union and held that the petitioner union had not proved that the respondents had effected a lock-out which could have been termed as illegal. It further held that the union had failed to prove that the respondents had committed breach of the service conditions by not paying wages on the stipulated dates. It also held against the union that it had not proved that the respondents had committed breach of the settlement dated August 14, 1991. Consequently, the Industrial Court held that the workers were not entitled to full