The jurisdiction of civil courts is excluded under Section 22(d) of the Payment of Wages Act to entertain claims that could have been recovered by an application under Section 15 of the Act, and this exclusion is absolute and does not depend on the choice of the claimant.

JUDGMENT :

1. This is an appeal for revision u/s 25 Small Cause Courts Act by Bhagwat Rai who had filed Civil Suit No. 83 of 1950 in the Court of Sri S.L. Sarma, First Civil Judge, (Class II), Bilaspur, empowered u/s 18 C.P. Courts Act.

2. Bhagwat Rai worked as a fitter-coolie under the Inspector of Works, Bengal-Nagpur Railway, Bilaspur, His case is that he was not paid a part of his wages for the months of November 1948 and March 1949 amounting to Rs. 76-4-0 and that as he was illegally suspended on 22 March 1949 by defendant 2, L.C. Mehta, Inspector of Works, and reinstated on 22 April 1949, he was entitled to Rs. 53 on account of the wages for the period of suspension. He, therefore, instituted a suit on 7 March 1950 for recovery of Rs. 137-3-3 inclusive of interest. The defendants filed written statements on 27 April 1950 but they did not raise any objection about the jurisdiction of the court. On 19 July 1950, however, they filed an application contending: that the court could not entertain the suit as it was for the recovery of wages which could have been recovered by an application u/s 15, Payment of Wages Act. The plaintiff replied by saying that the defendants had waived the objection regarding jurisdiction by not raising it in the written statement. The lower court held that it was not waived and after hearing arguments allowed it and dismissed the suit.

3. This case was set down for hearing by a Division Bench as V.R. Sen, J. who initially heard it held that the question of jurisdiction is of general importance.

4. The learned Counsel for the applicant raised before us the following four contentions:

(i) that the sums claimed in the suit were neither deductions from the wages nor sums in respect of which there was delay in payment of the wages but there was refusal either because payment was made or because it was not due and so they could not have been recovered by an application u/s 15, Payment of Wages Act.

(ii) that they could also not be recovered u/s 15, Payment of Wages Act, on the date the suit was filed because six months had already elapsed from the date on which the alleged deductions were made or the payment of wages was due to be made and so no application could be made on that date u/s 15 ibid.

(iii) that the application u/s 15, Payment of Wages Act, is an additional remedy to the ordinary remedy of a suit and not a remedy which has been substituted by law for the ordinary remedy of a suit.

(iv) that the defendants had waived this objection as to jurisdiction by not raising it in the written statements.

5. The sums claimed by the applicant are:

(a) Rs. 10-4-0 wages for November 1948.

(b) Rs. 66 wages for March 1949.

(c) Rs. 53 wages for the period of suspension from 22 March 1949 to 22 April 1949.

6. The defence is that the amount of Rs. 10-4-0 and the wages for March up to 22 March 1949 have been paid and that the plaintiff remained absent from duties without permission from 22 March 1949 to 22 April 1949 and is not consequently entitled to wages for this period.

7. The applicant thus says that the payment is due to him and it is delayed beyond the time fixed by Section 5, Payment of Wages Act, while the defendants deny it. There is thus a dispute as to the amount payable to the employed person and its consideration is within the competence of the authority appointed u/s 15 of the Act as would appear from Clause (a) of the proviso to Sub-section (3) thereof. The learned Counsel for the applicant contended that these were not delayed payments and cited in support Simplex Manufacturing Company Ltd. vs. Allaud-Din, AIR 1945 Lah. 195, which contains the following observations at Page 196:

There seems to be no authority directly to the point; but it seems to me clear that delayed wages can only mean wages which are admittedly due, but the payment of which has been postponed on some excuse or another. This view seems to be confirmed by the proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 15 in which it is said that a direction shou