Deliberate deprivation of the status and benefits of permanency to workers employed on permanent nature for more than four years and completed 240 days of working constitutes unfair labour practices under Item 6 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971.

JUDGMENT :

1. These three writ petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India impugn the orders of the Industrial Court, Pune, dated September 7, 1990 made in Complaints (ULP) Nos. 143 to 147 of 1987 under the provisions of Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act').

2. Though the facts in these writ petitions are marginally different, the facts common in all the writ petitions are :

Respondent-workmen in each of these writ petitions were employed in the service of the Petitioners for more than four years on jobs essentially of a permanent nature. Despite having been employed on work of a permanent nature for periods in excess of four years, and having completed more than 240 days working each of the Respondent workmen was treated, as a temporary employee. The Respondent workmen moved complaints (ULP) Nos. 143 to 147 of 1987 before the Industrial Court at Pune invoking Item 6 of Schedule IV read with Section 28 of the Act. It was the case of the Respondent-workmen before the Industrial Court that despite being employed on work of permanent nature, which each of them had been carrying out for more than four years continuously and having completed 240 days of working, they had been deliberately deprived of the status and benefits of permanency in work. That there is difference in the status and the benefits of permanent workmen and temporary workmen, is not in dispute.

3. The complaints were opposed by the Petitioners on the ground that the Petitioners are not an 'industry' and that each one of the Respondents had been made permanent in service by an order dated July 6, 1990 and, therefore, the cause of action had ceased to exist. The Petitioners, therefore, prayed for dismissal of the complaints. The Respondent workmen examined themselves before the Industrial Court and supported their cases. The crux of the evidence given by the Respondent workmen was that they were working on jobs which were of a permanent nature, that they were working for more than 240 days throughout unbroken periods in excess of four years and that they had deliberately not been accorded the status and benefits of permanent workmen with a view to deprive them of such status and benefits. Significantly, the Petitioners led no evidence whatsoever before the Industrial Court.

4. The Industrial Court assessed the only evidence on record and came to the conclusion that the Respondent workmen had proved that each of them had worked for 240 days, that each of them was employed on a job the nature of which was essentially permanent and that each one of them had not been made permanent. In view of the fact that no evidence had been led in by Petitioners to explain why the Respondent workmen had not been made permanent, the Industrial Court was constrained to conclude on the basis of the evidence before it that the only objective was to deprive the Respondent workmen of their status and benefits of permanency. The Industrial Court, therefore, found that the Petitioners had indulged in unfair labour practices within the meaning of Item 6 of Schedule IV of the Act. However, since the Respondent workmen had already been made permanent from different dates in July 1986, the Industrial Court merely directed that they should be extended with all benefits available to the permanent employees from the date on which each of them had completed 240 days working. These orders of the Industrial Court are impugned in the present writ petitions.

5. At the out set, it must be noticed that these writ petitions are under Article 227 of the Constitution of India wherein the jurisdiction of this Court is to ensure that the lower Tribunal has acted within the bounds of its jurisdiction and that the order impugned is not perverse. I have been taken through the orders impugned in these three writ petitions and the evidence on record of the Respondent workmen. The conclusions drawn by the learned