IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
D.V. PATEL, B.D. BAL, JJ.
BOMBAY PORT AND DOCK EMPLOYEES' UNION AND ANOTHER — Appellant
Versus
MEHER (M.R.) AND ANOTHER — Respondent
Special Civil Application No. 140 of 1964
Decided on : 17-08-1965
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT - S. 2(k) - S. 11(5) - APPOINTMENT OF ASSESSORS - JURISDICTION OF INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL - REORGANIZATION OF DEPARTMENTS - DEMAND FOR - WHETHER WITHIN THE DEFINITION OF "INDUSTRIAL DISPUTE" - STANDARD VACUUM REFINING COMPANY OF INDIA, LTD. V. THEIR WORKMEN AND ANOTHER 1960 II L.L.J. 233 - RELIED ON.
Fact of the Case:
Petitioners challenged the award of the industrial tribunal rejecting their application for appointment of assessors and holding that demand 14 in the charter of demands related to a matter of management of the business and was, therefore, not within the scope of its duties to determine the same.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the tribunal was right in rejecting the application for appointment of assessors as it had the discretion to do so under S. 11(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The court also held that demand 14, which called for reorganization of departments and increase in welding plats, was not connected with any of the matters enumerated in the definition of "industrial dispute" in S. 2(k) of the Act and was, therefore, not within the jurisdiction of the tribunal.
Issues: 1. Whether the tribunal was justified in rejecting the petitioners' application for appointment of assessors? 2. Whether demand 14 in the charter of demands was within the definition of "industrial dispute" and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the tribunal?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The tribunal has the discretion to appoint assessors under S. 11(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and its decision in this regard cannot be challenged. 2. Demand 14, which called for reorganization of departments and increase in welding plats, was not connected with any of the matters enumerated in the definition of "industrial dispute" in S. 2(k) of the Act and was, therefore, not within the jurisdiction of the tribunal.
Final Decision: The court discharged the rule issued to the tribunal, subject to the observations made regarding sub-items (iii) and (iv) of item B of demand 14.
JUDGMENT :
PATEL, J.
1. Petitioner 1 is the Bombay Port and Dock Employees' Union registered under the Indian Trade Unions Act and petitioner 2 is a worker in the workshop of respondent 2, Scindia Workshop, Ltd.
2. In 1948, there was an agreement between the company and its workmen produced at Ex. A, by which classification of employment was made, and introduced wage-scales for different categories of the workmen. Fresh disputes were raised in 1955 and an award was obtained from the industrial tribunal which, in some measure, modified the earlier agreement between the parties by raising the wages in the different scales but the classification continued as before. By a charter, the workmen made 35 demands against respondent 2. The State Government by its order dated June 13, 1963 referred these demands to the industrial tribunal for adjudication. The matter was taken up on June 18, 1963 when notices were issued to the respective parties. Both the parties filed their statements of claim and the matter was finally adjourned to October 22, 1963. The petitioners then filed an application on that day for appointment of assessors. It also appears that the matter was being argued on certain aspects of the demands before the tribunal. On November 18, 1963, the tribunal gave its first part of the award, and on December 5, 1963 it rejected the application for appointment of assessors. The petitioners seek to revise the award and the order of the tribunal.
3. Sri Nargolkar first contended that the tribunal was in error in rejecting the petitioners' application for appointment of assessors, only on the ground that it had a discretion to accede to the request or not. He argued that, under S. 11 of the Act of 1947, it is the bounden duty of the tribunal to appoint assessors when technical matters may be involved in a dispute between the parties. There is no substance in the contention. Section 11, Sub-section (5), clearly vests discretion in the tribunal to appoint assessor or assessors to advise him in such proceedings. And the matter is left beyond doubt by the use of the words "may, if it so thinks fit." There can be no better use of the words to indicate what the legislature intended. Every case must depend on its own facts, and necessarily, therefore, the tribunal must have jurisdiction to decide in which case it will appoint assessors and in which case it will not. In the present case, the tribunal says that some demands it has rejected are in the first part of the award, and as to the rest it did not think it necessary to appoint assessors. The tribunal has also further reserved its right to reconsider the question if it became necessary. There cannot be a fairer order than this. This claim must, therefore, be rejected.
4. Sri Nargolkar challenged the award on two grounds. He argued that the tribunal was not justified in rejecting some of the demands - as it has done by this award - when the application for appointment of assessors was being argued. There is no allegation in the petition that, on the question on which the tribunal has rendered its award, arguments were not heard or that the counsel was required to answer the contentions without any notice. We understand that this part of the case was heard for hours together by the tribunal, and it was only thereafter that it decided the matter. Inasmuch as both the parties addressed the tribunal on those demands, it cannot be said that there was no hearing in respect of the same. This ground for the attack, therefore, is not justified.
5. Sri Nargolkar then contends that, in any event, the tribunal was not justified in holding that, so far as demand 14 in the charter was concerned, it related to a matter of management of the business and, therefore, it had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the same. The tribunal relied upon certain observations made in some Australian cases and held that as it related primarily to managerial functions, it was not within the scope of its duties to determin
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