The main legal point established in the judgment is that the interpretation of a status quo order must be understood in the context in which it was passed, and any violation must be willful, deliberate, or intentional to warrant relief.

ORDER :

B.P. Colabawalla, J.

1. The above Interim Application has been preferred by the applicants/defendant Nos. 1 to 4 seeking the following reliefs:-

"(a) This Hon'ble Court may be pleased to appoint the Court Receiver of this Hon'ble Court as a Receiver to take possession of the property being Plot No. 250/1 and 250/2, Road No. 2, GIDC Sachin, Surat, 394 230, under Order 39 Rule 2-4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908;

(b) this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to attach all the properties of the plaintiffs, including plot No. 250/1 and 250/2, Road No. 2, GIDC Sachin, Surat, 394 230, under Order 39 Rule 2-4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908;

(c) This Hon'ble Court may be pleased to dismiss the present Suit under Order 39 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908;

(d) This Hon'ble Court may be pleased to order the plaintiffs to be detained in civil prison for a term not exceeding three months."

2. According to defendant Nos. 1 to 4, the reliefs sought in this application ought to be granted in view of the fact that the plaintiffs have violated the status quo order passed by this Court on 4 September, 2014 (for short "the 2014 order") in Notice of Motion No. 303/2011. For the sake of convenience the 2014 order reads thus:-

"Heard the learned counsel for both parties. After the matter was heard at some length, it is now agreed between the learned counsel for parties that both the parties, namely, Plaintiff Nos. 1 to 4 on the one hand and Defendant Nos. 1 to 4 on the other, shall maintain status quo in respect of their respective plots, namely plot No. 250/1 owned by plaintiff No. 1 and plot No. 250/2 owned by the H.U.F. of defendant No. 1 situated at Road No. 2, Sachin GIDC, Sachin. Surat, pending the hearing and final disposal of the suit. It is clarified that this agreement shall be without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties in Summary Suit No. 193 of 2010. The Notice of Motion is disposed of accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs."

(Emphasis supplied)

3. Dr. Chandrachud, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of defendant Nos. 1 to 4, submitted that plaintiff Nos. 3 and 4 are in possession of plot No. 250/1 and 250/2, Road No. 2, Sachin GIDC, Sachin, Surat, 394230 along with the factory standing thereon. He submitted that in relation to the said plots and the factory standing thereon, there were no third-party rights created in relation thereto as on the date of the passing of the 2014 order. Subsequently, it has come to the knowledge of defendant Nos. 1 to 4 that plaintiff Nos. 3 and 4 have inducted a third party, namely Padmavati Textile Mills (a proprietary concern of the respondent above named), as a lessee/licensee in the said property by entering into an agreement dated 23 November, 2019. This is in direct violation of the 2014 order, which directs plaintiff Nos. 1 to 4 on the one hand and defendant Nos. 1 to 4 on the other, to maintain status quo in respect of their respective plots, namely, plot No. 250/1 owned by plaintiff No. 1 and plot No. 250/2 owned by the H.U.F. of defendant No. 1. He submitted that it is, in these circumstances, that defendant Nos. 1 to 4 have preferred the present application inter alia seeking appointment of a Court Receiver to take possession of the aforesaid two plots and attach all the properties of plaintiff Nos. 3 and 4, pending the hearing and final disposal of the above suit.

4. Dr. Chandrachud submitted that plaintiff Nos. 3 and 4 have violated the 2014 order principally on two grounds:

(a) that the agreement dated 23 November, 2019 entered into with Padmavati Textile Mills is a Lease Agreement and not a Business Conducting Agreement as sought to be contended by the plaintiffs. This would clearly be in violation of the status quo order passed by this Court on 4 September, 2014; and

(b) even assuming that the aforesaid agreement dated 23 November, 2019 could be construed as a Business Conducting Agreement, it is still in violation of the order dated 4 Septem