Point of Law : Cause of suspension and initiation of punitive action based on petitioner’s conduct leading to his prosecution were found to be sufficient to hold such suspension to be justified therein.

JUDGMENT :

A. S. Chandurkar, J.

Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and heard the learned counsel for the parties.

The petitioner was appointed as Danger Building Worker (Semi skilled)-DBW (SS) in the Ordnance Factory, Chandrapur in 2003. He was thereafter promoted and while he was holding the post of DBW (HS)-II an offence under Section 419 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code was registered against him. When the offence was registered the petitioner was placed under suspension by the order dated 12/11/2009. After Crime No.308/2009 was investigated, the petitioner was tried as accused No.7 by the learned Junior Magistrate (First Class), Bhadrawati in Regular Criminal Case No.93/2010. The learned Magistrate by his judgment dated 16/07/2014 was pleased to acquit the petitioner along with some other accused in the said trial. After his acquittal in the criminal case, the petitioner on 12/08/2014 issued a communication to the General Manager of the Ordnance Factory informing him of the fact of his acquittal and requested that his suspension be revoked. On 08/10/2014 the Competent Authority in exercise of power under Rule 10(5) (C) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (for short, CCA Rules, 1965) revoked the order of suspension. The petitioner then made a request for treating the period of suspension from 12/11/2009 to 15/10/2014 as period spent on duty. The General Manager on 16/10/2015 issued a show cause notice to the petitioner that as he had been acquitted in the trial by granting him the benefit of doubt, his acquittal could not be said to be honourable. It was therefore proposed to treat his suspension from 12/11/2009 to 15/10/2014 as justified suspension and the period was to be treated as “not on duty” for all purposes. The petitioner was thus granted an opportunity to make a representation on the proposal. The petitioner on 26/10/2015 replied to the notice and stated that he had been honourably acquitted and therefore the period of suspension was liable to be treated as period on duty. On 13/04/2016 the Competent Authority regularised the period from 12/11/2009 to 15/10/2014 as “not spent on duty” for all intents and purposes.

2. The petitioner being aggrieved by the aforesaid order filed Original Application No.2167/2016 before the Central Administrative Tribunal. The Tribunal after considering the case of the petitioner as well as the stand of the respondents referred to Fundamental Rule 54-B(3) and found that the suspension of the petitioner was not wholly unjustified. The acquittal in criminal case was after granting the petitioner the benefit of doubt and hence by the judgment dated 20/08/2019 the Tribunal dismissed the Original Application. Being aggrieved the petitioner has challenged the aforesaid judgment of the Tribunal in this writ petition.

3. Ms Kirti Satpute, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner had been hounourably acquitted in the criminal trial. In view of the judgment of acquittal the suspension of the petitioner from service was not at all justified and therefore the period from 12/11/2009 to 15/10/2014 ought to be treated as period spent on duty. Referring to the judgment of the learned Judicial Magistrate (First Class) dated 16/07/2014 it was submitted that the trial insofar as the present petitioner and some accused was separated from that of other accused. The evidence on record led by the prosecution was found to be insufficient and therefore the petitioner came to be acquitted. The respondents were not justified in relying upon the opinion expressed by the learned District Government Pleader dated 21/05/2015 that the petitioner had been acquitted by granting him benefit of doubt. Reference was then made to the provisions of Fundamental Rule 54-B as well as Rule 5 of the Disciplinary Rules to urge that on the petitioner’s acquittal he was entitled to reinstatement along with full pay and allowances. The respondents did not