The legal point established is that the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950 must be strictly interpreted, and benefits cannot be extended to tribes not explicitly mentioned in the order.

JUDGMENT

Sunil B. Shukre, J. - Hearing is conducted through Video Conferencing and all the learned Advocates agreed that the audio and visual quality is proper.

2. Heard. Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith. Heard finally by consent of the parties.

3. The petitioner claims that her social status is that of "Chatri" which is a scheduled tribe as declared under the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, tribe "Chatri" is the same tribe as "Chattri" as given in the list of scheduled tribes under the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950. The petitioner also contends that there is a pre-constitutional document of the year 1934 which shows that the social status of the petitioner was that of a tribe known as "Chatri". Learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, submits that the impugned order passed by the Caste Scrutiny Committee is illegal and deserves to be quashed and set aside. This has been disagreed to by learned A.G.P. and learned counsel for respondent Nos.2 and 3.

4. The Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950 declares a tribe "Chattri" as a scheduled tribe by showing it at serial No.22 of the order. It is well settled law that entries in the constitutional order must be read as they stand in the order and it is not permissible for the Court to read something into the order which is not manifestly in it and the Court cannot add a single word or letter or comma or delete the same from the constitutional order. This is also the view taken by this Court when it rejected a similar case filed by one Madhuri D/o Ramesh Talewar and another V/s. Scheduled Tribe Caste Certificate Scrutiny Committee and others [Writ Petition No.804/2021 decided on 5th March 2021].

5. The pre-constitutional document in possession of the petitioner shows her social status as "Chatri" and not as "Chattri". The constitutional order does not make any mention of the caste or tribe "Chatri". Therefore, just because there is some similarity in the nomenclature of the social status claimed by the petitioner with the tribe declared by constitutional order, no benefit can be given to the petitioner.

6. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner should be permitted to complete her fire engineering course as the petitioner was provisionally admitted and permitted to complete half of the course by clearing examinations of 4 semesters and it was only in 2020 that the petitioner came to be removed from the college. He submits that if relief is granted to the petitioner by considering her case as a special case, the loss which would be otherwise caused to the petitioner, could be saved.

7. We find that a similar prayer made by the petitioner has been rejected specifically by this Court by passing an order on 9th February, 2021 while disposing of the Civil Application No.1093/2020. That apart, the petitioner had given an undertaking when she was granted provisional admission. Undertaking is to the effect that she would produce her caste validity certificate by the end of academic session 2020 - 2021, failing which as per the rules of Rashtrasant Tukdoji Maharaj University the petitioner shall stand disqualified for taking admission in the further academic session starting from 2020 - 2021. The order of the scrutiny committee came on 15th February, 2020 before the start of the next academic session 2020 - 2021 and, therefore, as per own undertaking given by the petitioner, she had already stood disqualified for taking admission to further course. So, no such relief as claimed about completion of course can be granted by this Court.

8. Here, we may also consider the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Chairman and Managing Director, Food Corporation of India and others V/s. Jagdish Balaram Bahira and others, (2017) 4 MhLJ 898. The Apex Court while dealing with the argument that if no special protection in the nature of permission to complete the course is g