The interpretation of Section 72(4) and the legislative intent behind the Amending Act 55 of 2017 were central to the court's decision.

JUDGMENT

1. Appellants have challenged the order dated 24th November, 2017 passed by the learned District Court, Solapur in Misc. Civil Application No. 77 of 2017 in exercise of powers under Section 72 of the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act.

2. The Registry and the respondents would object to the maintainability of the Second Appeal, in view of the deletion of Section 72 of the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act by Amending Act 55 of 2017.

3. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.

4. The original order was passed by the Deputy Charity Commissioner which was challenged by the respondents before the Joint Charity Commissioner under Section 70 of the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act. Appeal filed by the respondent was allowed. Feeling aggrieved, the appellants herein have challenged the same before the District Court under Section 72 of the said Act. The said application under Section 72 was pending when Amending Act 55 of 2017 came into force on 10 th October, 2017. The District Court dismissed the application on merits against which the Second Appeal is preferred. Amending Act 55 of 2017 i.e. the Maharashtra Public Trusts (Second Amendment) Act, 1977 came into force on 10th October, 2017. Vide Section 23 of the Amending Act, Section 72 of the Principal Act was deleted. Section 33 of the Amending Act reads as follows :

"33. Removal of doubts For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that nothing in the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act, as amended by the Maharashtra Public Trusts (Second Amendment) Act, 2017 (hereinafter referred to as "the said Amendment Act of 2017"), shall affect the applications or appeals pending before any Civil Court on the date of commencement of the said Amendment Act of 2017; and such applications or appeals shall be dealt with and disposed of by such Court in accordance with the law as its stood prior to the date of commencement of the said Amendment Act of 2017."

5. Admittedly, the application under Section 72 was pending before the District Court as on 10th December, 2017 and therefore the District Court has incorrectly dealt with the application in accordance with law as it stood prior to the date of commencement of the said Amendment Act of 2017. Section 72(4) as it stood reads as follows :-

"72(4) An appeal shall lie to the High Court, against the decision of the Court under sub-section (2) as if such decision was a decree from which an appeal ordinarily lies."

Explanation : In this section, the expression "decision" shall include a scheme framed or modified under section 50A.

6. It appears the appellants have relied on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Shivprasad Pardeshi vs. Lilabai, (1998) 1 Mh.L.J. 444, which has decided the following questions :

(i) Whether the Appeal filed under Section 72(4) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 is subject to the restrictions and limitations imposed on a "Second Appeal" as prescribed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

(ii)Whether an Appeal under Section 72(4) of the Act is maintainable even on questions of fact, mixed question of fact and law or mere question of law

The question was answered as follows :

"An appeal filed under Section 72(4) of Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 is a 'Second Appeal' to this Court and is subject to the restrictions and limitations imposed on a "Second Appeal" as prescribed under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

There is nothing in the scheme of section 72 of the Bombay Public Trust Act or for that matter any other provisions of the said Act which widens the scope of the appeal beyond the limits prescribed by section 100 C.P.C. In our view therefore, such an appeal is maintainable only if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law within the meaning of section 100 C.P.C."

Thus, it was held that the Appeal under Section 72(4) of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 is maintainable only if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial questio