The central legal point established in the judgment is the requirement for prompt consideration and disposal of representations in cases involving the curtailment of an individual's liberty, as guaranteed under Article 22 of the Constitution of India.

JUDGMENT

Manish Pitale, J. - Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard fnally.

2. By this writ petition the petitioner who is sister of one Illiyas Gulab Shaikh has challenged order dated 22.06.2020 passed by the respondent No.2. i.e. Commissioner of Police, Nashik City under the provisions of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug-offenders, Dangerous Persons, Video Pirates, Sand Smugglers and Persons Engaged in Black-Marketing of Essential Commodities Act, 1981 ("MPDA Act"), whereby the said Illiyas Gulab Shaikh (hereinafter referred to as "the detenue") has been detained. The detention order and the grounds of detention along with documents were served upon the detenue. It is the case of the detenue that he had preferred a representation on 02.09.2020 addressed to the State Government through the Superintendent of Nashik Road, Central Prison. The said representation of the detenue stood rejected on 18.09.2020 and it was communicated to the detenue on 21.09.2020.

3. In the present writ petition, various grounds of challenge have been raised against the said detention order dated 22.06.2020. But the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner while challenging the impugned detention order has placed specific reliance upon one particular ground, which pertains to delay in consideration and disposal of representation made by the detenue.

4. While raising the specific ground of challenge, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner invited attention of this Court to a few dates. It was brought to the notice of this Court that while the representation of the detenue was moved on 02.09.2020, it was rejected on 18.09.2020, which was later communicated to the detenue as late as on 21.09.2020. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, aforesaid delay in consideration and rejection of the representation in the present case was sufficient ground for setting aside the order of detention. It was submitted that there was inordinate delay in consideration of the representation and the process of calling for parawise comments from the detaining authority and other such proceedings took far too long, thereby justifying the prayer of the detenue for setting aside the detention order only on the aforesaid ground. In support of the said contention, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Harish Pahwa Vs. State of U. P., (1981) AIR SC 1126 and Solomon Castro Vs. State of Kerala, (2000) 9 SCC 561.

5. On the other hand, Mrs. M. H. Mhatre, learned APP appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that the aforesaid ground of challenge raised on behalf of the detenue was without any substance because the affidavits in reply fled on behalf of the detaining authority as well as the State Government placed detailed facts on record to indicate that there was no delay in considering and disposing of the representation of the detenue. On this basis, it was submitted that the said ground was not sufficient for setting aside the order of detention. Learned APP placed reliance on judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Noor Salman Makani Vs. Union of India, (1994) CriLJ 602 and Union of India Vs. Saleena, (2016) 3 SCC 437.

6. We have considered the contentions raised on behalf of the rival parties. The ground of challenge raised on behalf of the detenue concerns the alleged delay in consideration and disposal of the representation moved by the detenue against the detention order. There is no doubt about the fact that settled position of law indicates that since liberty of an individual is involved in such cases, it is extremely necessary for the State Government to consider and dispose of representations made against detention orders at the earliest and with utmost promptness. This is because a detention order curtails the liberty of an individual without the usual process of law being followed. In such circumstances, ev