The main legal point established is the appealability of orders under Sections 12 and 23 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, and the limited scope for interference by the appellate court in the magistrate's discretion.

JUDGMENT

1. Heard learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners.

2. Petitioners intend to challenge the order passed below Exhibit-4 dated 07-09-2020 in Criminal Miscellaneous Application No.69 of 2019 by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ambajogai. The said application has been filed by the present respondent under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). The order has been passed under Section 23 of the said Act directing the petitioner No.1 to pay maintenance at the rate of Rs.25,000/- per month.

3. A preliminary objection will have to be raised regarding the maintainability of the writ petition, when Section 29 of the said Act makes a specific provision for an appeal. The learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners then submitted that it was the interim order that was passed and there is no specific provision and it cannot be said to have been included in Section 29 of the said Act. The constitutional jurisdiction of this Court is always open and, therefore, the writ petition is maintainable. However, in the alternative, the learned Advocate for the petitioners also submitted that if this Court comes to the conclusion that the appeal under Section 29 of the said Act is the only appropriate remedy, then he be allowed to withdraw the writ petition with liberty to file appeal under Section 29 of the said Act before the appropriate Court.

4. The said point has been considered by the Principal Bench of this Court in Abhijit Bhikaseth Auti Vs. State of Maharashtra and Another, (2009 Cri. L. J. 889). The question that arose for consideration in the said petition was :-

(i) Whether an order passed on an application made under Section 23 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as "the said Act") is appealable under Section 29 of the said Act?

(ii) Whether an appeal will lie under Section 29 of the said Act against every order passed by the learned Magistrate in proceedings initiated on the basis of an application made under Section 12 of the said Act?

(iii) What is the scope of an appeal under Section 29 of the said Act?

5. After having dealt with all the concerned provisions, the conclusions have been summarised as under :

(i) An appeal will lie under Section 29 of the said Act against the final order passed by the learned Magistrate under sub-section 1 Section 12 of the said Act;

(ii) Under sub-section 2 of Section 23 of the said Act, the learned Magistrate is empowered to grant an ex-parte ad-interim relief in terms of sections 18 to 22 of the said Act. The power under sub-section 1 is of granting interim relief in terms of sections 18 to 22 of the said Act. Before granting an interim relief under sub-section1, an opportunity of being heard is required to be granted to the respondent.

(iii) An appeal will also lie against orders passed under sub-section 1 and sub-section 2 of the Section 23 of the said Act which are passed by the learned Magistrate. However, while dealing with an appeal against the order passed under Section 23 of the said Act, the Appellate Court will usually not interfere with the exercise of discretion by the learned Magistrate. The appellate Court will interfere only if it is found that the discretion has been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, perversely or if it is found that the Court has ignored settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interim relief.

(iv) An appeal under Section 29 will not be maintainable against purely procedural orders which do not decide or determine the rights and liabilities of the parties.

6. Therefore, when this Court has already dealt with the point that there is no necessity for this Court, in absence of contrary material produced before this Court, to take different view. Further, it will not be out of place to mention that in Jallarapu Laxman Rao and Ors. Vs. Jallarapu Pedda Venkateswarlu and Ors., () and in Fulchand Motiram Yada