The court emphasized the importance of substantial justice over technical considerations and the need for a justice-oriented approach in considering explanations for delay.

JUDGMENT

S.G. Mehare, J. - The present is an application to condone 591 days delay in preferring the application to review the judgment and order dated 7. 03.2013 passed by this High Court in W.P. No. 921/2012.

2. The new fact that the Final plot no.5 initially allotted to the applicant was included and was the part of the first variation of the Town planning scheme no.1 at Shrirampur, was discovered from his friend Shri Porwal in October 2014. He received the relevant document under the Right to Information Act from the Arbitrator. Then the applicant applied for copies of the document and relevant maps to the Arbitrator on 21.10.2014 under the Right to Information Act. However, he had not received those documents till filling the present application. The applicant approached the lawyer with the photocopies of those documents in the Diwali Vacations in October 2014.

3. After the dismissal of his W.P. No. 921/2012, the applicant had undergone the heart operation on 13/14.04.2013 and was bedridden. The applicant’s daughter had also suffered paralysis. Hence due to ailments and family problems, the applicant was not in contact with Mr. Porwal, who has fled a W.P. No. 5274/2012 for the same grievance. It is pending. The situation was beyond the control of the applicant. It is not deliberate. It is prayed to condone the delay in the interest of justice.

4. The learned Senior Counsel for the respondent/non-applicant Shri Sapkal, has strongly opposed the application. He referred to the order passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 28409/2013 dated 20.09.2013 and vehemently argued that the applicant’s petition which was fled against the order of this Court, passed in W.P. No. 921/2012, dated 7. 03.2013 was allowed to be withdrawn with liberty to approach the State Government for appropriate relief. However, the applicant approached this Court with a Review Petition. Hence, the application deserves to be dismissed. The delay is not satisfactorily explained.

Therefore, it is not liable to be condoned. To bolster his argument, he relied on National Spot Exchange Limited Vs. Anil Kohli, Resolution Professional for Dunar Foods Limited, 2021 SCC Online SC 716.

5. The learned Senior Counsel Shri Dhorde for the applicant would submit that the Arbitrator made the false statement in the original writ petition. Hence, it culminated in dismissal of his petition. Soon after knowing about the new facts and evidence in October 2014, the present application and Review Application was fled within a month. The substantial right of the applicant is involved in the petition. No one shall sufer for the wrongs committed by others.

6. The law is settled that the length of the delay is not material, but the reasons stated for the condonation of delay. In other words, for condonation of delay, the reasons adduced must be proper, convincing, and acceptable.

7. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the Landmark case of Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag V Mst Katiji and Ors, 1987 AIR 1353, has pronounced that ‘when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. Further, the law is also settled that a justice-oriented approach is necessary while deciding the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act. A liberal view must be taken in considering an explanation offered for the delay if reasonable cause is offered. Condonation of the delay is a matter of discretion of the Court. However, it must be recognized that discretion is the discretion of law and not the subjective discretion of the Judge.

8. In National Spot Exchange cited (supra), the appellant had preferred the appeal before the NCLT under Section 61 (2) of the IB Code. Under said Section, the appeal was required to be preferred within a period of 30 days. The proviso to th