The judgment reaffirms the double presumption of innocence in favor of the accused in an appeal against acquittal and highlights the limitations on the appellate court's power to interfere with the trial court's findings.

JUDGMENT

M S Jawalkar, J. - The present Appeal is filed against the order of acquittal passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, 'A' Court, Ponda in Criminal Case No. 37/S/2009/A (hereinafter referred as impugned judgment).

2. The case of the prosecution in nutshell is that, on 11.10.2008 at 11:30 hours, the respondent/accused, criminally trespassed and abused in the office of the Hon'ble Transport Minister, Shri Sudin Madhav Dhavalikar (PW-2) at Maharashtravadi Gomantak Party's office, near Mahalaxmi Temple, Bandora, Ponda with filthy language and threatened him with dire consequence to kill him and thereby, the accused committed an offence under Section 448, 504 and 506(ii) of IPC.

3. Based upon the complaint filed by Shri Gopi Puno Naik dated 11.10.2008, FIR was registered under No. 175/2008 and chargesheet came to be filed on 09.04.2009. Charges came to be framed and prosecution examined 11 witness to prove its case.

4. The learned JMFC, Ponda vide judgment dated 15.05.2014 acquitted the respondent and being aggrieved thereby, the present Appeal is preferred by the appellant-State.

5. I have heard Shri Mahesh Amonkar, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the appellant-State and Shri S.D. Lotlikar, the learned Senior Counsel, who appears along with Shri Prasheen Lotlikar, the learned Counsel for the respondent.

6. Before I proceed further, it needs to be noted that the present Appeal being Appeal against acquittal, while deciding the same, the principles laid down in Chandrappa & Others Vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 needs to be borne in mind.

7. The Hon'ble Apex Court held that when there is Appeal against acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person should be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved to be guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured an acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is certainly not weakened but reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the Trial Court. In the very said judgment, general principles regarding powers of an Appellate Court while dealing with the Appeal against an order of acquittal are laid down as under:

(1) An Appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded;

(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law;

(3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes' etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.

(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.

(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court.

8. Keeping in view the above principles, I proceed to decide the matter.

9. The main grounds raised by the learned Additional Public Prosecut