The main legal point established in the judgment is that the by-law no.44(5) was not inconsistent with the provisions of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960, and the petitioner had already ceased to be a member of the Board of Director before the decision was made, leading to the allowance of the Writ Petition.

JUDGMENT

Mangesh S. Patil, J. - Heard. Rule. The Rule is made returnable forthwith. The learned advocate Mr.Wagh waives service for respondent no.1, learned advocate Mr.Suryawanshi waives service for respondent no.2 and the learned A.G.P. waives service for respondent nos.3 to 5. At the request of the parties, the matter is taken up for final decision at the stage of admission.

2] The petitioner is aggrieved by the order of respondent no.5 Minister allowing revision of the respondent no.2 under Section 154 of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 (hereinafter the Act) whereby the learned Minister confirmed the order passed by the respondent no.3 District Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Societies (D.D.R.) holding the petitioner to have incurred a disqualification from continuing as a Director of the respondent no.1 Credit Cooperative Society under the provisions of Section 73CA (4) read with by-law no.44 (5) of that Society, on the ground that in violation of the by-law he was already a Director of another Credit Cooperative Society. In doing so, the learned Minister has quashed and set aside the order passed by the respondent no.4 Divisional Joint Registrar who had quashed and set aside the order of the D.D.R. and had dismissed the complaint of the respondent no.2.

3] Pursuant to the stand of the petitioner, learned advocate Mr.Shelke would assail the decision of the D.D.R. and the learned Minister on 2 counts. According to him, by-law no.44(5) of the respondent no.1 Society, is inconsistent with the provisions of Section 73A. When the legislature has laid down specific grounds for disqualification which do not contain any provision debarring a person from being a Director of two societies, bylaw no.44(5) laying down such a condition is clearly inconsistent and consequently illegal. In support of his submission he would place reliance on the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Babaji Kondaji Garad Versus Nasik Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd. Nasik and others; (1984) 2 S.C.C. 50.

4] His second argument is that the petitioner had already tendered resignation from the Board of Directors of Respondent No.1 Society on 06/08/2019. Since there was no stipulation in the by-laws and the act as to the manner in which such a resignation is to be tendered and accepted, it unilaterally operated with immediate effect i.e. the date on which it was tendered, and consequently when the dispute was raised before the D.D.R., he having already ceased to the Director of respondent no.1 Society, there was no reason for passing any order of his disqualification by resorting to bylaw no.44(5). In support of his submission he would place reliance on the decisions in the cases of Arun Trivikramrao Rajurkar and others V/s Gowardhan Janardhan Khotre and others; 1982 Mh.L.J. 576 and Prakash Mahadeo Khot & Ors V/s Maruti Dada Khot & Ors; 2005 (4) Bom.C.R.568.

5] Per contra, the learned A.G.P. and the learned advocate for the respondent no.2 would submit that bylaw no.44(5) merely provides for an additional ground for disqualification and cannot be said to be inconsistent with Section 73A of the Act. In this regard they would place reliance on the decision of this Court in the matter of Sambha S/o Gangaram Pikale Versus State of Maharashtra and others; 1996 (2) Mh.L.J. 182.

6] So far as tendering of resignation is concerned, the learned A.G.P. and the learned advocate for the respondent no.2 would submit that it was a unilateral act of the petitioner. The resignation was never accepted by the respondent no.1 and he continued to hold the post of Director in the respondent no.1 Society even while he was a Director in Saraswati Gramin Bigar Sheti Sahakari Patsanstha.

7] Section 73A of the Act lays down the provisions inter alia laying down various grounds on which a designated officer would incur disqualification. It provides for the definition of a designated officer to mean the Chairman or the President and also any other officer as may be declared b