The main legal point established in the judgment is that proceedings arising from a show-cause notice should be concluded within a reasonable period, and the failure to do so without a satisfactory explanation may result in the proceedings being set aside. Additionally, the court emphasized the obligation to return any amount deposited under protest during an investigation with interest.

JUDGMENT

Dipankar Datta, CJ. - The first petitioner is a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. It, inter alia, carries on business of exporting fabrics. The second and the third petitioners are the Directors of the first petitioner (hereafter "the Company", for short). It is claimed by them that there has been a change of their names/surnames from Harish Chander Tuteja and Dinesh Chander Tuteja to Harish Arya and Dinesh Arya, respectively. To that effect, they have annexed Government of Maharashtra Gazette Notification dated 30th December 1999, Exhibit-' A' to the writ petition.

2. A show-cause notice dated 30th April 1997 (Ext. XC to the writ petition) was issued to the Company under section 124 read with section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 (hereafter "the Act", for short). It was alleged therein that the Company had indulged in fraudulent export of polyester fabrics and duty-free import of Polyester Filament Yarn and other items under D.E.E.C. Scheme in contravention of the provisions of the Act. In course of investigation preceding such show-cause notice, a raid had been conducted at the premises of the Company on 9th August 1995. The second and the third petitioners having been arrested, it is alleged by them that they were compelled to pay an amount of Rs.68 lakh on 10th August 1995. It is further alleged that only after such payment, the Department agreed not to oppose their prayers for bail and consequently, the second and the third petitioners were released on bail by an order dated 10th August 1995 of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Mumbai. On subsequent occasions too, the petitioners claim to have further been forced to pay Rs.32 lakh and Rs.1 crore. The said show-cause notice, inter alia, sought to recover the sum of Rs.2 crore, which the petitioners allege they were compelled to deposit, and adjust the same against the total demand of Rs.4,99,53,772/- mentioned in the show cause notice.

3. The grievance voiced by the petitioners in this writ petition dated 15th December 2020 is that the show-cause notice has not been adjudicated during the 23 years of its existence; accordingly, a prayer has been made to set aside such notice as well as the proceedings that followed and for a direction on the respondents to return to the petitioners the said sum of Rs.2 crore deposited under protest during the investigation together with accrued interest at the prime lending rate prevalent in 1995-1996, in accordance with law.

4. The writ petition refers to several decisions of this Court in support of the contention that proceedings having once been initiated, the same ought to be concluded within a reasonable period and what would be a 'reasonable period' ought to depend on the facts of each case.

5. Appearing in support of the writ petition, Mr. Shroff, learned senior counsel contended that the proceedings have remained pending for close to two decades and a half, and by no stretch of imagination can pendency for such unreasonably long period be regarded as a reasonable period.

6. Mr. Shroff relied on the decision of a coordinate Bench of this Court dated 26th November 2020 in Writ Petition No. 12904 of 2019 (Parle International Limited v. Union of India and Others). There, the Bench upon consideration of several precedents held that a period of 13 years for revival of the show-cause notice impugned therein could not be termed as a 'reasonable period' and, accordingly, observed as under:

"27. In any view of the matter when the commencement of adjudication proceedings after inordinate delay of 13 years post-issuance of show-cause notices and submission of reply is held to be untenable in law, any consequential decision or order based on such delayed adjudication would also be rendered invalid.

28. Thus, having regard to the discussions made above and taking an overall view of the matter we have no hesitation to hold that respondents were not justified in commencing adjudication proceeding 13 years after issuan