The central legal point established in the judgment is the court's authority to quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the unconstitutionality of Section 66A of the I.T. Act.

JUDGMENT

M.S.SONAK,J.

1. Heard Mr. Amit S. Kinkhede, learned counsel for the applicant, and Mr. S.S. Doifode, Additional Public Prosecutor for Nonapplicant Nos.1 and 2, and Mr. Pankaj v. Navlani, Advocate for Nonapplicant No.3.

2. Rule. The rule is made returnable forthwith at the request of and with the consent of learned counsel for the parties.

3. By this application under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the applicant invokes the inherent powers of this Court and seeks to quash of First Information Report No.3468/2011, dated 26.5.2011 and the consequent charge-sheet No.770/2011 dated 3.10.2011.

4. The allegation in the impugned F.I.R. and the charge-sheet is that the applicant has committed offenses punishable under Sections 66A and 66C of the Information and Technology Act, 2000 (in short, "I.T. Act ").

5. Mr. S.S. Doifode, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for non-applicant Nos.1 and 2 and Shri Pankaj Navlani, learned counsel for non-applicant No.3 submit that the present application may not be entertained because the applicant has already applied for discharge before the competent Court where the impugned charge-sheet has been filed.

6. According to us, this objection cannot be upheld having regard to the law laid down by the Hon 'ble Apex Court in G. Sagar Suri and another vs. State of U.P. and others (2000) 2 SCC 636. In this case, the Hon 'ble Supreme Court has held that the jurisdiction of the High Court for quashing a criminal proceeding under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code can be exercised even when the application for discharge of the accused is pending before the trial Judge. A similar view is adopted in Keki Hormusji Gharda and others Vs. Mehervan Rustom Irani and another (2009) 6 SCC 475.

7. Mr. S.S. Doifode and Mr. Pankaj Navlani then submitted that a similar application was filed by the present applicant which was disposed of by this Court by its judgment and order dated 26th June 2014 and, therefore, the present application is not maintainable.

8. Again, upon perusal of the order dated 26th June 2014 made in Criminal Application No.332/2013 we find that this Court had made it clear that it was not interfering at the relevant stage, but liberty was granted to the applicant to renew his grievance again if he finds that his persecution continues. Besides, this order was passed at a stage when Section 66A of the I.T. Act was on the statute book. Subsequently, in the case of Shreya Singhal Vs. Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1 , this provision has been struck down as violative of Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution. Therefore, we are satisfied that the order dated 24.6.2014 cannot disable the applicant from maintaining the present proceeding.

9. As noted earlier, the applicant is alleged to have committed an offense under Section 66A of the I.T. Act. However, in the case of Shreya Singhal (supra), the Hon 'ble Supreme Court has struck down the provisions of Section 66A of the I.T. Act as ultra vires and unconstitutional. Obviously, therefore, no prosecution is maintainable under Section 66A of the I.T. Act and the F.I.R. and the consequent charge-sheet to the extent it invokes Section 66A of the I.T. Act will have to be quashed and set aside. The F.I.R. is also registered under Section 66(C) of the I.T. Act.

10. Section 66C of the I.T. Act reads as follows :

"Punishment for identity theft. -Whoever, fraudulently or dishonestly make use of the electronic signature, password or any other unique identification feature of any other person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine which may extend to rupees one lakh. "

11. In this case we have read the complaint, F.I.R., and the charge-sheet and from the reading and analysis of the same, we are unable to find any allegations whatsoever about the applicant having fraudulently or dishonestly making use of any electronic signature, password, or any other un