SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

2022 Supreme(Bom) 712

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY AURANGABAD BENCH
VIBHA KANKANWADI, J.
Yadav Chandoba Dawlekar – Petitioner
Vs.
The State of Maharashtra and Another – Respondents
Criminal Appeal No. 733 of 2018
Decided On : 08-09-2022

Advocates:
Advocate Appeared:
For the Petitioner: R.O. Awasarmol.
For the Respondents: A.M. Phule, Pooja V. Langhe.

The main legal point established in the judgment is the importance of proving the age of the victim to establish the commission of offences under the POCSO Act. The judgment emphasizes the admissibility of evidence such as school admission registers and the presumption under the POCSO Act.

Headnote:

POCSO - Conviction under Sections 363, 376 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3 punishable under Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offices Act - Indian Penal Code, POCSO Act - 363, 376, 3, 4

Fact of the Case:

The appellant was convicted for offences under Sections 363, 376 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3 punishable under Section 4 of the POCSO Act. The appellant was sentenced to imprisonment and fine. The appellant challenged the conviction on the grounds of age of the victim and lack of evidence.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the prosecution had proved the age of the victim to be below 18 years, establishing her as a 'child' under Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act. The court held that the accused had committed the offences and imposed the appropriate sentence.

Issues: The key issue was whether the prosecution had proved the age of the victim to establish her as a 'child' under the POCSO Act. The court also considered the evidence related to the accused's relationship with the victim and the circumstances of the incidents.

Ratio Decidendi: The court relied on the testimony of the victim, the school admission register, and the medical examination to establish the age of the victim. The court also considered the presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act and the accused's failure to rebut the presumption.

Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed, and the conviction and sentence of the appellant were upheld.

JUDGMENT :

VIBHA KANKANWADI, J.

1. The appellant is the original accused who has been convicted in Special Case (POCSO) No. 19 of 2015 by the learned Special Judge / Additional Sessions Judge-4, Nanded on 17th August 2018 after holding him guilty of committing offence punishable under Sections 363, 376 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3 punishable under Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offices Act (for short “POCSO Act”). The appellant – accused has been sentenced to suffer simple imprisonment for five years and to pay fine of Rs.5000/- for the offence punishable under Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code and in default of payment of fine he has to suffer further simple imprisonment for two months. Further, appellant has been sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for ten years for the offence punishable under Section 3 read with Section 4 of the POCSO Act and to pay fine of Rs.5000/- and in default of payment of fine, to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for six months. However, appellant has been acquitted of the offence punishable under Section 366-A of the Indian Penal Code. No separate sentence has been awarded for the offence punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code.

2. Heard learned Advocate Mr. Awasarmol for the appellant, learned APP Mr. Phule for respondent No. 1-State and learned Advocate Mrs. Langhe appointed for respondent No. 2.

3. It has been vehemently submitted on behalf of the appellant that the learned Special Judge has not considered the evidence properly. The crux of the matter is, as to whether the prosecution has proved that the girl is “child” as defined under Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act. If we consider Exhibit-26, which is the statement of mother of the victim - PW-1, which was taken on 5th February 2015, then at that time she has given age of the victim as 19 years. In this case, the First Information Report (for short “FIR”) is stated to have been lodged on 15th February 2015. When the FIR was lodged, it was only under Section 363 and 366-A of the Indian Penal Code and there was absolutely no mention about the age of the girl. Further, as per the prosecution story itself the earlier incident is stated to have taken place on 19th November 2014 when mother of the victim had received message that the girl was missing from Nanded where she was residing in hostel. Even it was told by brother of the accused that the girl has been kidnapped by the accused and on the request to the said brother of the accused, the girl was brought to the house of the informant on 26th November 2014. There was no FIR lodged at that time, though it is stated that by the said statement dated 5th February 2015 it was informed by the informant to the Police that the girl has been found. Naturally, it would have been on the basis that the informant herself told to the Police that the girl is 19 years of age. Though in her testimony PW-1 has tried to say that at that time her daughter was 16 years of age, but her own statement Exhibit-26 would disclose that the victim was 19 years of age. The second incident is stated to have taken place on 12th February 2015 when the victim did not return from her coaching class. The FIR, thereafter has been lodged on 15th February 2015. Therefore, in this case it was utmost necessary for the prosecution to prove the birth date of the girl to show that she was “child”. In her cross-examination, PW-1 has stated that the birth certificate of the girl is available and she can produce it, however it was not produced at all. The defence of the accused is that the girl was major and had eloped with the accused with consent as well as she had physical relations with him with consent. The victim is now saying that at the time of incident she was 16 years of age. She has denied portion of her statement also which indicates that in her statement under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure she had accepted that she was loving accused and had gone along with acc

      Click Here to Read the rest of this document
      1
      2
      3
      4
      5
      6
      7
      8
      9
      10
      11
      SupremeToday Portrait Ad
      supreme today icon
      logo-black

      An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

      Please visit our Training & Support
      Center or Contact Us for assistance

      qr

      Scan Me!

      India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

      For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

      whatsapp-icon Back to top