The court emphasized the importance of prima facie evidence and the interpretation of Section 43D of U.A.P. Act in granting bail.

JUDGEMENT

V.G. BISHT, J.

1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. By consent, heard finally at the stage of admission.

2. By this appeal under Section 21 of the National Investigating Agency Act, 2008 (NIA for short), the appellant seeks quashing and setting aside of the impugned order dated 20th August 2021 passed by the learned Special Judge - NIA, City Civil and Sessions Court, for Greater Bombay, below Exhibit 56 in NIA Special Case No. 06 of 2019 by which the appellant’s application for bail came to be rejected and as such, seeks his enlargement on bail.

3. Before we appreciate the rival contentions of the parties, we deem it proper to outline the factual aspects of the prosecution case.

4. On 1st May 2019, an IED blast took place under the bridge on Purada-Kurkheda Road, Gadchiroli, in which fifteen QRT policemen and one civilian driver were killed. On 2nd May 2019, First Information Report (FIR) No. 19 of 2019 was registered at Purada Police Station, Gadchiroli under Sections 302, 353, 120B, 147, 149, 427 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), Sections 16, 18, 20, 23 of Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (U.A.P. Act for short), Sections 4 and 5 of Explosive Substances Act and under Sections 5 and 8 of Arms Act.

5. The prosecution then alleges that on 11th June 2019 the appellant came to be arrested in Hyderabad. On 24th June 2019 the investigation was transferred to NIA and accordingly, NIA registered FIR No. 2 of 2019 on 25th June 2019.

6. The prosecution further alleges that on 19th June 2019 the house in which the appellant and his wife resided in Hyderabad was searched and various electronic items and a sum of Rs.10,32,000/- were seized. Chargesheet was filed on 4th December 2019. So also necessary sanction was granted on 21st September 2020 in respect of appellant and other co-accused under the Maharashtra Control of Organized Crimes Act (MCOC Act for short). A supplementary chargesheet was filed under the MCOC Act against all the accused in September 2020.

7. On 20th August 2021, the learned Special Judge rejected the appellant’s application for bail. Hence, the present appeal.

8. Ms. Payoshi Roy, learned counsel for the appellant, at the very outset submits that the material on record does not substantiate any of the allegations levelled against the appellant and the appellant has been arrested and prosecuted only on the basis of suspicion as it is the prosecution case that the appellant’s wife is the leader and member of the banned organization CPIM. There is no shred of evidence to link the appellant to the present offence i.e. the IED blast resulting in the death of 15 policemen and one civilian driver.

9. The learned counsel next argued that though the prosecution alleges that the appellant attended a conspiracy meeting in July 2018 but the same has not been substantiated and even assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant did attend the meeting, that in itself will not incriminate the appellant in the alleged offences.

10. Lastly, the learned counsel vehemently submitted that the prosecution wants to believe that the present appellant is also known as Kiran or Kiran Kumar but there is no evidence to that effect.

11. According to the learned counsel, the appellant is more than 70 years old with severe ailments and restricted mobility. The charge is yet to be framed by the trial Court and the trial is not likely to commence in the near future and will take long time to conclude. Having regard to all these circumstances, the appellant’s appeal for bail deserves consideration.

12. Mrs. Pai, learned special public prosecutor, strenuously opposed the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant and invited our attention to the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of NIA. The learned special public prosecutor also invited our attention to the various statements at page nos.1, 15, 21, 29 and 36 of compilation of statements/documents and emphasized that there is prima facie involvement of the appellant in the al