The central legal point established in the judgment is that development agreements can be considered conveyance under the Stamp Act if they have the trappings of transfer of immovable property inter vivos, and not every development agreement can be treated as an instrument equivalent to conveyance without examination of its true nature.

JUDGMENT :

1. Heard.

2. The review of the judgment dated 05.05.2022 has been sought on two grounds: firstly, the agreements involved in the petition were purely development agreements and therefore, could not have been interpreted to be having characteristics of a conveyance and as such, were beyond the scope of the Article 25 of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 (for short “Stamp Act”). The second ground, relates to a general statement made in paragraph No.14 that since, the stamp duty payable on the development agreement is the duty which is payable on conveyance under Article 25 of the Stamp Act a development agreement would have to be treated at par with an instrument of conveyance and therefore, it is an instrument which is squarely covered by the notification dated 28.08.2020.

3. It is submitted by Shri.Anand Parchure, learned Special Counsel that a development agreement cannot be considered to be same as the conveyance under Article 25 of the Stamp Act and therefore generally it cannot be said to be covered by the notification dated 28.08.2020.

4. Shri.S. N.Shukul, learned counsel appearing for the non applicant submits that both these submissions have already been considered by this Court while delivering the judgment in question and therefore, this is not a case, wherein an error manifest on the record has been committed by this Court. He, therefore, urges that the application be dismissed.

5. As regards the first ground taken in this review application, we are of the opinion that same has been considered by examining in detail the facts and circumstances of this case and in the context of such an examination, this Court has found that the development agreements involved in the petition were also capable of being called as conveyance within the meaning of Section 2(g) and 2(l) of the Stamp Act. Therefore, as rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner, this is not a case of error apparent on the face of the record, as far as first ground of challenge is concerned.

6. As regards the second ground of challenge, we find some substance therein, but only at the first blush. There is a statement generally made in the first part of paragraph No.14 of the judgment in question to the effect that ultimately the stamp duty payable on the development agreement is as per the duty payable on a conveyance under Article 25 of the Stamp Act and therefore development agreement would have to be treated at par with an instrument of conveyance and hence, it is an instrument which is squarely covered by the notification dated 28.08.2020. However, this general preposition has to be understood in the context in which it has been used. The contextual setting is provided by the conclusion drawn by this Court as regards the nature and characteristic of the development agreements involved in the petition. These development agreements were examined threadbare by this Court, with the assistance of the learned special counsel for the petitioner and learned AGP then this Court found that these development agreements had the trappings of transfer of immovable property inter vivos and therefore, found that these development agreements answered the essential ingredients of the terms ‘conveyance’ as defined under Section 2(g) and ‘instrument’ as defined under Section 2(l) of the Stamp Act. It was on this backdrop that, a proposition was put forward that a development agreement chargeable with stamp duty as conveyance under Article 25 of the Stamp Act would also be eligible for having the benefit of notification dated 28.08.2022. It was never the intention of this Court that this proposition should be used generally, as applicable to all situations and all cases. Thus, even though, it is not necessary for us to consider the second ground raised in this review application, by way of abundant precaution, we clarify that not every development agreement, without being examined for its true nature, would be capable of being called an instrument as equ