IMPORTANT POINT
The court established that the limitation for filing a suit for specific performance begins from the date fixed for performance, and that sympathy cannot override legal principles in judicial decisions.

JUDGMENT/ORDER

1. The plaintiffs have impugned the judgment and decree of the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Amalner, passed in Special Civil Suit No.27 of 2013, dtd. 7/1/2016 and judgment and decree of Regular Civil Appeal No.8 of 2016 passed by the learned District Judge-1, Amalner, dtd. 5/8/2019.

2. Both Courts denied the specific performance and held that the suit was time-barred. However, allowing the suit partly surprisingly, directed respondent no.1/vendor to refund the earnest amount with interest.

3. The learned counsel for the appellants has vehemently argued that both Courts did not consider the facts of the case. Both parties to the agreement were reciprocally accommodating to each other. The sale deed was to be executed after clearing the debts and encumbrance. The appellants and respondent No.1 were residing in one building. The appellants were tenants in the suit premises. The appellants possess the suit premises through a registered agreement to sell. Since the vendor had some difficulty, the appellants extended the time twice by executing separate agreements. However, in the last document extending the time to perform the part of the contract by the vendor, the deadline was 30/6/2008.

4. The learned counsel for the appellants has tried to convince the Court that since clearance of the debt was a condition precedent for execution of the sale deed, there was no delay in filing the suit. Since the landlord did not clear the loan, a notice was served upon him, and that was the cause of action to file a suit. However, both Courts erred in law in disbelieving the appellants. He has also argued that the witnesses have been examined to prove readiness and willingness. It has been specifically averred in the plaint that the appellants were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. However, the trial Court committed a serious error of law in ignoring the pleadings and recording a finding contrary to the pleadings. He has also argued that the first part of Article 54 of the Limitation Act would not apply to the facts and circumstances of the case. When there was a reciprocal agreement, though the date was part of the contract was extended up to 30/6/2008, it cannot be said that it was the agreed date to perform the part of the contract. Until the filing of the suit, the vendor did not clear the debts. Hence, the society and the bank were also arrayed as defendants. The appellants were financially sound to pay the remaining consideration. Since they were residing in one building, they used to meet and know his family's condition. The appellants trusted him. Therefore, considering the family condition of the vendor, they did not insist on executing the sale deed as there was a clear understanding that the sale deed would be executed after clearing the debts.

5. The learned counsel for the appellants further submits that the appellants have complied with Sec. 16(c) of the Specific Reliefs Act. However, the learned trial Court wrongly applied the ratio in the case of Hasan Nurani Malak Vs. Mohansing and another, 1974 Mh.L.J. 120 and Manunath Anandappa Urf Shivappa Hansi Vs. Tammanasa and others, AIR 2003 SC 1391.

6. The thrust of the arguments of the appellants was that both Courts have erroneously held that the appellants were never ready and willing to perform their part of the contract, and the suit is barred by limitation. In pursuance of this observation, he read the last document extending the time. He has interpreted the terms of the said document that the date 30/6/2008 was not the date for the specific performance of the contract, but it was the date for clearing the debts. Hence, it cannot be said that 30/6/2008 was the date the limitation began to run to bring the suit as per Article 54 of the Limitation Act.

7. He has also referred to the original agreement dtd. 31/10/2007 and argued that clearance of the debt was a condition precedent for execution of the sale deed. If this aspect is conside