The court affirmed the permissibility of name substitution in compassionate appointment cases even after reaching the age limit, emphasizing that such policies should not undermine the objective of providing immediate assistance to the deceased's family.

JUDGMENT

ANIL S. KILOR, J.

1. Heard.

2. A bunch of petitions, challenging clauses 3.11 and 3.21 of the Government Resolution, dated 21/09/2017 issued by the State of Maharashtra as regards its policy relating to the compassionate appointments, were listed before a Division Bench. (Coram: A.G.Gharote and M.S. Jawalkar, J.J.)

Clause 3.11 fixes the upper limits for such appointments as 45 years. It further contemplates deletion of name in the eventuality where the appointment is not made till the age of 45 years.

Clause 3.21 permits substitution of name of one of the legal heirs of a person wait-listed for compassionate appointment, if he/ she passes away before the appointment is made.

3. The Division Bench, on hearing the aforesaid bunch of petitions, formed an opinion that, the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Dnyaneshwar S/o.Ramkishan Musane ..vs.. State of Maharashtra and others, reported in 2020(5) Mh.L.J. 381 , permitting substitution of name contrary to clause 3.21, does not consider the object of the policy in light of what has been held consistently in Umesh Kumar Nagpal ..vs.. State of Haryana, reported in (1994) 4 SCC 138 , Nilima Raju Khapekar ..vs.. Executive Director, Bank of Baroda & Oth., reported in 2022(3) Mh.L.J. 441 and State of West Bengal ..vs.. Debabrata Tiwari , reported in AIR 2023 (SC) 1467 . In the above- mentioned backdrop, on the Division Bench’s request the matter is referred to answer the following questions:

(i) Considering the object of compassionate appointment, to provide immediate succour to the family of the deceased employee who dies in harness, as is spelt out in Umesh Kumar Nagpal (supra), Nilima Raju Khapekar (supra) and Debabrata Tiwari (supra), whether the view taken in Dnyaneshwar Musane (supra) and in other similar matters as indicated above would be correct?

(ii) Whether the policies of the State, which provide for creating a wait list of the candidates for compassionate appointment and in cases permits substitution, even on account of crossing a particular age limit of 45 years is contrary to the object and purpose for which a compassionate apportionment has to be granted?

4. It is manifest from the question No.(ii) that, it is in two parts namely:

(a) Whether the policy of the State, which provides for creating a list of candidates for compassionate appointment is contrary to the object and purpose for which a compassionate appointment has to be granted?

(b) Whether the policy of the State, which permits substitution even on account of crossing particular age limit of 45 years is contrary to the object and purpose for which a compassionate appointment has been granted?

5. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties.

6. Shri Akshaya Sudame, Shri S.P.Bhandarkar, Shri Rajnish Vyas, Ms. Sonali Saware-Gadhwe, Ms Sapna Jadhav, Shri Prashit Gawai, Shri U.J. Deshpande, Shri A.H. Daga, Shri P.R. Agrawal, Shri S.S.Taram, and Shri S.A. Mohta learned counsel made the following submissions:

a) Since the whole object of granting compassionate appointment is to enable the family to tide over the sudden financial crises, the substitution of name would not defeat the said purpose for the reason that, such substitution would not result in granting appointment to more than one family member of the deceased.

b) There is no period provided under the scheme framed by the State of Maharashtra, on expiry of which the family of the deceased would become disentitled to claim compassionate appointment. Hence, substitution even on the ground of crossing the age limit of 45 years cannot be said to be contrary to the object and purpose of compassionate appointment.

c) The Division Bench of this Court has taken a just and proper view in the case of Dnyaneshwar Musane (supra), which was followed in many subsequent similar matters by this Court. It is submitted that in the said judgment the substitution is held to be permissible.

d) It is further submitted that, the wait list of the cand