SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT (F.B.)
K. Bhaskaran, C.J., Sriramulu and
Lakshminarayana Reddy, JJ.
Kalavathi - Petitioner
versus
The State of A.P. and another - Respondents
Writ Petition No. 11961 of 1986
Decided on 20.11.1986

Advocates:
B. Subhashan Reddy, Advocate - For the Petitioner.
Advocate General - For the Respondents.

IMPORTANT POINT
What would constitute "grounds of detention" are all the allegations of fact which have led passing of the order of detention.

Headnote:Prevention of Black Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980 - Section 3-Detention of owner of lorry transporting paddy in violation of clause 3 of A.P. Paddy (Restrictions on Movement) Order, 1983 read with Section 7 of Essential Commodities Act, 1955-Charge also including violation of clause 7 of A.P. Rice Procurement (Levy) Order, 1984-Later charge of clause 7 of Levy Order is found not existent-Whether detention order becomes a. nullity on that account? - (No). (Para 6)

       Held, the submission of the counsel for the petitioner is that as it was conceded by the respondents themselves that there was no violation of clause 7 of the Rice Order, one of the grounds had fallen to the ground, and therefore the whole order of detention had become invalid and was liable to be set aside. In other words, it proceeds on the assumption that the number of grounds on which the detention order is based would depend upon the number of provisions of law stated to have been violated by the acts attributed to the detenu. In our view, this is not the proper criterion to determine the number or the substance of the 'grounds mentioned in a detention order. What would constitute 'grounds of detention,' according to us, are all the allegations of facts which have led to the passing of the order of detention If this guiding principle is borne in mind, in this case, it could be found there that are no two grounds, but only one ground, namely, the detenu was found to transport without a permit paddy from the districts in Andhra Pradesh to a neighbouring district across the border in the Maharashtra State. The subjective satisfaction of the second respondent is in relation to the aforesaid activity stated to have been indulged in by the detenu. It is not disputed that the said activity on the part of the detenu would squarely fall within the ambit of clause 3 of the Paddy Order. Merely for the reason that the detaining authority expressed the view that the said activity would also be violative of another provision of law, namely, clause 7 of the Rice Order, what otherwise is one ground would not become the grounds; nor would the finding that the whole activity amounted to violation of clause 3 of the Paddy Order alone and that there was no violation of clause 7 of the Rice Order render the detention order as a nullity. (Para 6)

       

JUDGMENT

K. Bhaskaran, C.J. - This Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is by one Smt. Kalavathi for the issue of a writ of Habeas Corpus for setting at liberty her husband, Shivasari Gangadhar (hereinafter referred to as 'the detenu') who is undergoing detention pursuant to the order dated 6-6-1986 passed under Section 3 of the Prevention of Blackmarketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980, by the second respondent, the District Magistrate (District Collector), Adilabad. The gravemen of the charge against the detenu is that he is the registered owner of lorry bearing No. A.T.J. 3041, and that he had been transporting paddy from Adilabad district in this State to Dharmabad District in Maharashtra State by making use of that lorry, without any permit in that behalf which he amounted to violation of clause 3 of the A.P. Paddy (Restriction on Movement) Order read with Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. In the operative portion of the grounds it is stated as follows;

"You, thus contravened the provisions of (a) Cl. 3 of A.P. Paddy (Restriction on Movement) Order, 1983, (b) Cl. 7 of A.P. Rice Procurement (Levy) Order 1984 r/w. Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955."

When the matter came up before the Division Bench earlier, it was contended that though the facts alleged would amount to contravention of the provisions of Clause 3 of A.P Paddy (Restriction on Movement) Order, 1983 (for short the paddy order'), they would not amount to a contravention of clause 7 of A.P. Rice Procurement (Levy) Order, 1984 (for short, 'the Rice Order'); and therefore, one of the grounds alleged and relied on by the detaining authority was non-existent and irrelevant; and, therefore, the detention order was illegal and was bound to be set aside. To press this point, the counsel for the petitioner had placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Dwaraka Prasad v. State of Bihar1 wherein it was held that even if one of the grounds or reasons which led to the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority was non-existent or misconceived or irrelevant, the order of detention would be invalid and it would not avail the detaining authority to contend that the other grounds or reasons were good and did not suffer from any such infirmity, because it could never be predicated as to whether the detention order would have been made at all even in the absence of non-existent or irrelevant grounds.

2. On behalf of the respondents, the learned Advocate General had drawn the attention of the Division Bench (to a recent Division Bench ruling of this Court (which appears to have been so far not reported) in W.P. No. 13033 and 13037/85 dated 11-12-1985, wherein it was held;

"Merely because a repealed Order is mentioned in the order of detention, it cannot be said that the order of detention is vitiated or becomes void. No decision has been brought to our notice in support of the said proposition. We also do not think this that the addition of a repealed Order has, in any manner, disabled the detenu from making a representation or to put forward his case."

3. In view of the fact that there appeared to be an apparent conflict between the decision of the Supreme Court, on the one hand, and the decision of our Division Bench, on the other, and considering the importance of the question of law involved, the Division Bench has referred the matter to a Full Bench; and thus it is before us now.

4. The short facts are:

5. The second respondent received a letter dated 13-5-1986 from the Additional Superintendent of Police, Vigilance Cell, Civil Supplies Department, Nizamabad, containing a proposal that the detenu, who was acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community by smuggling paddy from Andhra Pradesh to Maharashtra, had to be detained in order to prevent him from carrying on such activities. The second respondent considered the propo

Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon Back to top