IMPORTANT POINT
Offence u/s 307 I.P.C. is not compoundable u/s 320 Cr. P.C. But sentence can he altered to what had already undergone where LR's of deceased victim assented that accused was living as a good neighbour with them and had sincerely demonstrated his repentance.

JUDGMENT

A.M. Bhattacharjee,.J,- After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner and the Slate and examining the records ourselves, we have not been able to discover any infinity in the Order of conviction, passed by the trial Judge and affirmed in appeal, to warrant our interference in revision. But for the reasons stated here under, we propose to alter the sentence.

2. The accused, convicted under Section 307 of the Penal Code, has been sentenced to imprisonment for Jive years. The victim of the of kill x is now dead and before us in this Court, the heirs of victim of the offence have filed an application praying that the panics may be granted permission to compound the offence and the accused-petitioner may be acquitted. As provided in Section 320 (4)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, when the person who would otherwise be competent to compound the offence is dead, his legal representatives may, with the consent of the Court, compound such offence. But the offence under Section 307 of the Penal Code, not being compoundable under Section 320 or any other provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the victim himself, if alive, could not be permitted to compound the offence and, therefore, could transmit no right to his heirs to pray for such permission.

3. Though the position ought to have been the same even without the aid of the provisions of Section 320(6), the sub-section has, nevertheless, expressly provided that "a High Court or Court of Session acting in the exercise of its powers of revision under section 401 may allow any person to compound any offence which such person is competent to compound under this Section". We are, however, afraid that the expression "power of revision under Section 40 1" is rather inappropriate in respect of court of Session, which exercises powers of revision, not under Section 401. but under Section 399 which, and which alone defines and determines the revisional powers of a court of Session and has made the powers exercisable by the High Court under Section 401 also available to the court of Session. We must also note the provisions of section 320 (9), which, without leaving the matter to the ambivalent and ambulatory rules of interpretation of statutes, has categorically provided that "no offence shall be compounded except as provided - under this section 320.

4. Mr. Dutta, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner has, however, drawn our attention to a two-Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Mahesh Chand v. State of Rajasthan1 and has urged that since the Supreme Court in that case permitted an offence to be compounded, even though the same was not compoundable under Section 320, we would not be acting illegally in permitting the parties to compound the offence under SecLionJ07 of Penal Code, notwithstanding the legislative mandate to the contrary in Section 320(9) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If it could be shown that the Supreme Court went on doing SO in cases after cases, we might have thought that we would not be going wrong in following the course so often resorted to by the apex Court of the Land and we might have derived some assurance from the pronouncement of Manu, our most respected ancient Law-Giver (Manu Samhita, chapter IV, verse 178) to the effect that in case of doubts arising out of contrary mandates, one should follow, the course adopted by the forefathers and would commit no wrong by doing so "Yenasya Pitaro Yata, Yena Yata Pitamahah, Tena Yayat Satang Margang, Tena Gachchhan Na Dusyate". But we have not been referred to any other decision in which the Supreme Court adopted such a Course to enable us to hold that our superior Court has sanctioned the Course by repeated recourse.

5. Law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on us as absolute authority, not only under the mandate under Article 141, but even de hors that Article, because of the precedent-bound system of judicial administration, borrowed by us from the Birtishers and followe