IMPORTANT POINTS
1. Order of Magistrate u/s. 451 Cr. P.C. granting interim cltstody of property is not an interlocutory.
2. When rival claims are made for interim custody oia vehicle, ordinarily the R.e. Owner is to be preferred but there may be a case where a person who is not a R.C. owner but who is in lawful possession of the vehicle will have to be preferred to R.C. Owner for giving interim custody of the vehicle.

ORDER

M.M. Mirdhe, J. - This Cr.R.P. is filed by the petitioner who is an accused in the trial court under Section 397 read with 401 of Cr. P.C., against the order dated 28.12.1989 passed by the Prl. Sessions Judge, Shimoga in Cr.R.P. No. 29189 scttingaside the order dated 14.11.1988 passed by the II Additional Munsiff and J.M.F.C., II Court, Shimoga in C.C. No.5123/88.

2. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Government Pleader for R.1 and the learned counsel for R.2.

3. The petitioner filed a complaint against respondent No. 2 alleging that he has committed an offence punishable under Section 379 I.P.C. by committing the theft of his Autorickshaw. The complaint was referred to Scote Police Station, Shimoga under Section 156(3) Cr. P.C. The police investigated into the case and filed 'B' report to the effect that the complain of the complainant is false. The petitioncr challenged the 'B' report filed by the police. The trial Court took cognizance of the offence and sworn statements of the complainant and his witnesses were recorded and summons was issued to the respondent No. 2. At that stage, the petitioner filed an application under Section 451 Cr. P.C., for the interim custody of the vehicle. Respondent No. 2 also filed an application under Section 451 Cr. P.C. The State Bank of Mysore also filed an application for the interim custody of the vehicle and the learned Munsiff and J.M.F.C., II Court, Shimoga after hearing all the concerned parties in the matter passed an order dismissing the applications of the petitioner and the State Bank of Mysore for the interim custody of the Autorickshaw and she allowed the application of respondent No. 2, and granted interim custody to him. Respondent No. 2 was aggrieved by this order and he preferred Cr.R.P. No. 28/89 in the Court of the Pel. Sessions Judge, Shimoga against the said order. The learned Prl. Sessions Judge, Shimoga after hearing both sides passed an order on 28.12.1989 allowing that revision petition and setting aside the order of the learned Munsiff and I.M.F.C., Shimoga granting interim custody of the Autorickshaw to respondent No. 2. Being aggrieved by that order, the petitioner who is an accused in the trial Court has preferred this revision petition.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the Sessions Judge has no jurisdiction to entertain the revision petition filed by respondent No. 2 as the order passed by the learned Munsiff and I.M.F.C., was only an interim order. This point has been dealt with by this Court in the case of M. Abbas v. State of Kamataka1. His Lordship has relied on the ruling of the Supreme Court in interpreting the expression "interlocutory order". The relevant portion of his Lordships in that judgment is as follows:

"Taking the first contention of Mr. Gopalakrishna, it appears, thefc is not much substance in the same. What is an interlocutory order has not been defined. This was also one of the contentions raised before the learned Sessions Judge, and he has rightly rejected the contention after discussing the case law on the point. In Madhu Limaya v. State of Maharashtra their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed:

"Ordinarily and generally the expression 'interlocutory order' has been understood and taken to mean as a converse of the term 'final order'. In volume 22 of the third edition of Halsbury's laws of England at page 742, however, it has been stated in para 1806:-

“…. a judgment or order may be final for one purpose and interlocutory for another, or final as to part and interlocutory as to part. The meaning of the two words must therefore be considered separately in relation to the particular purpose for which it is required.".

In para 1607 it is said:

"In general a judgment or order which determines the principal matter in question is termed final."

In para 1608 at page 744 and 745 we find the words:"

“An order which does not deal with the final rights of the parties, but either (1) i