IMPORTANT POINT
When there are discrepancies and contradictions of significant nature in the evidence of witnesses the prosecution case can not be said proved.

ORDER

Dr. A.S. Anand, J. - This appeal under Section 19 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Prevention Act, 1987 (hereinafter TADA) is directed against the ORDER and order dated 29th March 1993, passed by the Designated Court for Greater Bombay.

2. The appellant was tried for offences under Section 3 read with Section 5 of the TADA and Section 3(1) read with Section 25 (1-B (a) of the Arms Act, 1959 by the Designated Court. The prosecution case against him was that on 16.1.1991, at about 3 p.m. P1 Dhoble (P.W. 4) on receipt of some information that the appellant, belonging to Amar Naik gang, had taken shelter in Pansare Chaw1, situated near the junction of Sane Guruji Marg and N.M. Joshi Marg, Bombay, proceeded to the spot along with. PSI Vernekar (P.W. 1), PSI Pote (P.W. 2), PSI Dhanvat, PSI Maralkar and some constables for raiding the place. The raid operations of the police party, however, did not result in any criminal being apprehended from Pansare Chawl, and when the police party came out they found a white fiat car bearing Registration No. MFA-1305, with the appellant sitting on the driver seat, parked there. On seeing the police party, the appellant who was sitting on the driver seat, opened the door and made an attempt to run away. He was, however, chased and over-powered. The panchas were called and in their presence, the appellant was searched. He was found to be in possession of a Country made pistol loaded with one cartridge. One more cartridge of the similar type, was found in the right hand pocket of the appellant while one magazine loaded with seven cartridges was found in the pocket of the pant of the appellant. The fire arm and ammunition, along with the keys of the motor car MFA-7305, were seized under a panchnama and sealed by the police parity. The appellant was arrested and taken to the police station where PSI Vernekar (P.W. l) lodged the F.I.R. Ex. 6, for the offences, as noticed above, against the appellant. The fire arm and ammunition seized from the appellant were sent to the Forensic Laboratory and on receipt of a sport from the laboratory, sanction to prosecute the appellant was obtained. The appellant did not possess any licence for the arms and ammunition. Pansare Chawl had been declared as a notified area under Section 2(t) of TADA by the State of Maharashtra and for the purposes of Section 5 of TADA, unauthorized possession of the arm, by itself constitutes punishable offence. The appellant was, therefore put on trial for the offences noticed above.

3. The prosecution examined PSI Vernekar P.W. 1, PSI Pote P.W. 2, PI Dhoble P.W. 4 and Sudhakar Ambedkar P.W. 3. The appellant denied the allegations against him and pleaded false implication. The learned Designated Court after appraisal of the evidence and taking into consideration the facts of the case, including the alleged confession of the appellant recorded before DSP Ambedkar Ex. 9-A, came to the conclusion that the appellant was not guilty of committing any offence under Section 5 read with Section 3 of TADA and consequently he was acquitted of the said offences. The appellant, however, was found guilty and convicted for the offences under Section 3(1) read with Section-35(1-B (a)) of the Arms Act and sentenced to suffer R.I. for two years and two months and to pay a fine of Rs. 5001 - and in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days. The appellant is on appeal before us.

4. That the appellant has already undergone the sentence imposed upon him by the Designated Court is not disputed by learned Counsel for the parties, but whereas Mr. Bhasme, learned Counsel for the State of Maharashtra submitted that since the appellant had already undergone the sentence, the appeal did not merit any further consideration, Sh. R.K. Jain, the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellant, on the other hand submitted that the evidence on the record did not justify the conviction of the appellant at all and, therefore, the appellant dese