IMPORTANT POINT
It is imperative for invoking legal presumption U/S 113-B of Evidence Act to prove that "soon before her death" deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment.

ORDER

Neelam Rani, wife of the appellant, died of burns on 17.6.1987. Her husband, the present appellant, and his father and grandmother were arrayed as accused before the Sessions Court in connection with the death of Neelam Rani charging them with offences under Sections 302, 304B and 498A of the IPC. The Sessions Court acquitted the grand mother, who was in her eighties, but convicted the appellant as well as his father of all offences and sentenced them to imprisonment for life. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana on the joint appeal filed by those convicted persons acquitted appellant's father but confirmed the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC. The High Court pointed out that in view of the said conviction it was unnecessary to maintain the conviction under the other two offences. Appellant filed this appeal by special leave in challenge of the said conviction and sentence.

2. There seems to be no dispute on the fact that Neelam Rani died of burns on 17.6.1987. The prosecution case in brief is that appellant was persecution her with the demand for more dowry and at last set her ablaze for not quenching his greed for dowry. On the other hand the stand of the appellant, when questioned under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, was that by frustration, as she could not give birth to a child and as she could not adjust in the village life with the appellant, she committed suicide by burning herself.

3. The High Court counted some circumstances, in the absence of any eye-witness, and reached the conclusion that the circumstances have concatenated themselves into a complete chain establishing that appellant had killed her by setting her ablaze after dousing her with kerosene.

4. On a scrutiny of the evidence we are of the view that the circumstances are far too meagre for reaching the conclusion that appellant had set her on fire.

5. When Neelam Rani's father-Bhagwan Dass (PW-3) on hearing about the precarious condition of his daughter rushed to see her at the Civil Hospital, Kaithal, all that he could see was her charred body. When he saw the appellant standing nearby he asked him whether she was killed by him, to which appellant answered with folded hands that it was a mistake on his part for that he should be forgiven.

6. The above circumstance was taken seriously by the High Court as an incriminating conduct of the appellant. Along with it High Court counted the evidence of Zile Singh (PW-5). But that witness did not stick to the version assigned to him by the prosecution, and hence he was treated as hostile. He was to speak to the words he heard from the deceased as soon as he reached the scene of occurrence. He was confronted with a letter which he had sent to PW-6 in which he promised that he would never revert from what he has already committed to the police. But PW-5 in his testimony in court said that he could not hear anything which deceased had muttered as it was too inaudible. The testimony of PW-5 is therefore of no use to the prosecution except to the extent he saw Neelam Rani in flames and the inmates of the house remaining aghast.

7. We are unable to agree with the finding reached by the High Court that on the said circumstances Neelam Rani was murdered by the appellant.

8. But it is a certainty that Neelam Rani died under abnormal circumstances. If it is not a case of homicide, it could be a case of suicide because her death by accident could reasonably be ruled out from all the broad circumstances in this case, we have now therefore to consider whether appellant can be fastened with the penal liability under Section 304-B of the IPC.

9. The primary requirements for finding the appellant guilty of the offence under Section 304-B IPC are that death of the deceased was caused by burns within seven years of her marriage and that "soon before her death" she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by the appellant for or in connection with any demand for dowry.

10. The first premise stan