IMPORTANT POINT
Though the revision before the High Court under sub-section (1) of Section 397 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, is prohibited by sub-section (3) thereof, inherent power of the High Court is still available u/s 482 of the Code and as it is paramount power of continuous superintendence of the High Court, the High Court is justified in interfering with the order leading to miscarriage of justice.

JUDGMENT

K. Ramaswamy, J. -Leave granted.

2. This appeal by special leave arises from the Judgment dated 26th March, 1992 passed by the Madras High Court in Crl. O.P. No. 10678 of 1991. The facts relevant for our purpose are that in a litigation between Krishnaveni, the first respondent and Tulasiammal, the second wife of her husband, Chinnikrishnan, the first appellant, Krishnan had offered his services and promised to help the first respondent in conducting the said litigation and asked her to execute a Power of Attorney for that purpose in his favour. It is the case of the first respondent that on faith of the promise of the first appellant, she went to Sub-Registrar's office at Madurai where the first appellant made her sign on some stamp papers in the presence of the Sub-Registrar. Later it transpired the first appellant had got her signature on an agreement to sell her land (which indicates that she had received Rs. 20,000/-) and not the Power of Attorney as she was given to understand. According to the first respondent, when the appellants came to her house on April 15, 1989 and demanded money purported to have been spent by the first appellant in the litigation and wanted her to execute the sale deed in her favour, she made enquires and came to know that the first appellant had played fraud upon her with dishonest intention to cheat her and obtained her signatures on the purported agreement to sell dated September 13. 1988. Consequently, she lodged a complaint with the police on April 24, 1989 and the crime came to registered as Crime No. 31 of 1989 under Sections 420 and 406 IPC. The Sub-Inspector after investigation submitted a report stating that the case was essentially of a civil nature and no criminal case was made out. Thereupon, the first respondent feeling aggrieved, brought the matter to the notice of Superintendent of Police, Madurai and requested him to assign the same to another officer to make an honest investigation. Accordingly the Inspector of Police, Crime Branch was entrusted with the investigation. After thorough investigation, the Inspector filed the charge- sheet under Section 173, Cr. P.C. on December 4, 1989 which disclosed commission of the offences under Sections 420 and 406. IPC. On receipt thereof, the Judicial Magistrate No.1. Madurai had taken cognizance of the offences and issued summons on February 22, 1990. Thereupon, the appellants filed an application to discharge them. The Magistrate on the said application discharged the accused in Criminal M.P. No. 262 of 1990 by order dated 22nd February, 1990. The respondents feeling aggrieved thereby, filed Revision Applications before the Sessions Judge and the matter was transferred to the First Additional Sessions Judge who by order dated March 26, 1991 dismissed the revision petition. On a further Revision filed by the first) respondent in the High Court, by order dated March 26, 1992 it allowed the Revision by the impugned Order and set aside the order of the Magistrate and directed him to consider the facts on merits at the trial. Thus this appeal by special leave.

3. When the matter had come up for hearing, upon consideration of the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellants, in particular Dharampal & Ors. v. Ramshri (Smt.) & Ors.1 and Rajan Kumar Manchanda v. State of Kerala2 the matter was referred to a three-Judge Bench. Thus, the appeal has come up before us.

4. Shri Krishnamurthy, learned counsel for the appellants, contended that the State as well as the respondents having availed of the remedy of Revision under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, the "Code") the High Court was devoid of power and jurisdiction to entertain the second revision due to prohibition by subsection (3) of Section 397 of the Code. Therefore, the impugned order is one without jurisdiction and vitiated by manifest error of law warranting interference. In support of his contention, the learned counsel placed strong re