1997 (3) Crimes 175
MADRAS HIGH COURT
N. Arumugham. J.
R. Rajendran -Appellant
versus
D.S.P. Vigilance & Anticorruption Madras -Respondent
C.A. No. 663 of 1993
Decided on 21-6-1996
Counsel for the parties:
For the Appellant: Mr. V. Srinivasan, Advocate.
For the Respondent: Mr. A.N. Rajan, Govt. Advocate.

IMPORTANT POINT
The evidence of a bribe giver has to be scrutinised very carefully and it is the duty of the court to consider and appreciate the evidence in a proper manner.

Headnote:(i) Prevention of Corruption Act - Sections 7 and 13(2) r/ws 13(1)(d) - Conviction for offence under- Challenged - Accused was Grade I Executive Officer of an Institution organized by a mutt which owns property - P.W. 2 was deemed to be tenant of one portion of premises Notice issued to all tenants demanding payment of rent with 100 percent enhancement – Objections-Allegations that Accused/appellant demanded a sum of Rs. 6,000/- as bribe - Trap case - Defence plea that accused received a sum of Rs. 4,000/- from P.W. 2 as rental advance in presence of P. W. 6 - Prosecution failed to prove that what was paid by P.W. 2 was the bribe money - Evidence of decoy witness P. W. 2 is suspected and rejected - Delay of 12 days in filing complaint unexplained - Prosecution failed to prove guilt of accused beyond all reasonable doubts - Accused is entitled to be acquitted.

       Held: That the claim of P.W. 2 bristles with every surmounting suspicious circumstances. The preponderance of improbabilities is all the more inherent in his claim and the probabilities and naturalness are totally lacking in his claim. His testimony before the trial Court that he has paid M.O. 1 series as the bribe money appears to me very dubious in nature and character and superfluous, remains solitary and without an iota of support, corroboration or substantiation. The delay in setting the law in motion by lodging EX.P.9 after a lapse of 12 days from 6-9-1991 would belie the prosecution case in toto and this aspect is only a death knell to the whole claim of P.W. 2. Therefore, on this count also, I have no hesitation to suspect and disbelieve the claim of P.W. 2 in its entirety. All the more, he does not seem to be a mere stranger. He was all along a tenant in the-occupation of a portion of the rental premises paying rent to the accused and committing default, subletting the two portions of his father and thereby collecting the rent from them also without any permission. He is doing business in the portion in his occupation. It is noticed that he has sent a reply notice already, however, the gravity-of disputes is seem to have been narrowed down by the intervention of P.W.5. Even so, it is also noticed for the part of his arrears, there is no dispute and with regard to M.O. 1 series alone, a complaint under Ex. P.9 was thought over to be lodged after a lapse of 12 days. Which, in my well considered view is clearly a scheme emerged out in the mind of P.W. 2. (Para 24)

       In so far as the defence theory projected by the accused is concerned, pursuant to sub-clauses (3) and (4) of Section 19 of the amended Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 20 of the Act, once the accused admits the possession of the bribe money, the presumption to be drawn is that the tainted money is the bribe money having regard to the facts of the instant case and the legal evidence made available on behalf of the respective parties, I feel totally satisfied in accepting the case of the defence that from the tenor of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and the defence documents, it has been clearly established that what was received by the accused on the evening of 19-9-1991 under M.O. 1 series was not the bribe money but only as an advance rental and that the prosecution has miserably failed to establish the guilt of the accused for the offence of bribery as charged and tried. There is a big and volume of doubt however with every seriousness and the benefit of which should be ascribed in favour of the appellant/ accused by setting aside the judgment of conviction and sentence rendered against him by the trial Judge. It is thus having considered every gamut of the case, adduced evidence and the projected contentions on behalf of both parties, I am fully constrained to hold that the various other observations and findings given by the learned trial Judge are not based on the correct perception of law and the whole observation seems to be on account of the total misconception of the adduced evidence and that therefore, the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubts and that as a result, the accused is entitled to be acquitted of all the charges. (Para 25)

       (ii) EVIDENCE - Bribery Case -Decoy or a trap witness - Performance of - Ingredients to be followed by courts of law with regard to - Extent and nature of corroboration - 1995A.I.R. S.C.W. 2717: Relied on.

       Held: That the standard or the nature of a trap witness, who becomes a party to a transaction, becomes the victim of threat or coercion and assumes the character of an accomplice by reason of his being the bribe giver. It is for the duty of the Court to consider the degree and complicity and then look for the corroboration if necessary as a rule of prudence. The extent and nature of corroboration may vary according to the facts of each case and that corroboration can even by proving the circumstances and that as such no general rule can be laid down with respect to the quantum of evidence required corroborating the testimony of trap witness, which again would depend upon its own facts and circumstances. All the more, it could be said that the Court should weigh the evidence and then see the standard of corroboration, which is required. As a matter of rule of law, it cannot be laid down that the evidence of every complainant in a bribery case should be corroborate in all material particulars and otherwise it cannot be acted upon: Whether corroboration is necessary and if so to what extent, and what should be its nature, all depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. There is a caution declared by the Apex Court that the evidence of a bribe giver has to be scrutinised very carefully and that it is the duty of the Court to consider and appreciate the evidence in a proper manner. (Para 24)

       Result: Appeal allowed. Judgment of conviction set aside.