Important Point
The true import of words “in any other manner” in the definition of “action” in Section 2(1) of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984 connotes other categories of administrative action; it cannot be interpreted to mean actions which have no nexus to any administrative action e.g. allegation of amassing of wealth by respondents an IPS officer.

Headnote:Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984 —Sections 7(2) r/w 2(1)—Matters which may be investigated by Upalokayukta—True import of the definition of action in Section 2(1) of the Act—Allegation of amassing of wealth by respondent an IPS Officer—Upalokayukta receiving an unsigned letter forwarded by under Secy. to Governor of Karnataka—Whether Upalokayukta was competent to investigate—High Court holding that the definition of action was confined to administrative actions by any public servant, therefore, amassing of wealth could not be an administrative action for purposes of Section 7 of the Act—Whether correct? (Yes)—Appeals dismissed.
       Held : A perusal of the definition indicates that it encompasses administrative action taken in any form whether by way of recommendation or finding or ‘in any other manner’, e.g., granting licenses or privileges, awarding contract, distributing Government land under statutory Rules or otherwise or withholding decision on any matter etc. The expression ‘in any other manner’ takes it in fold the last mentioned categories of administrative actions. Mr. Nagaraja has argued that the expression ‘in any other manner’ will have to be given a wider meaning so as to include other actions of the public servants such as the action of the respondent in amassing wealth otherwise the very purpose of the Act will be frustrated. We are afraid we cannot accede to the contention of the learned counsel as it would not only be contrary to the principle of construction of statutes but will also be repugnant to the object of the Act, pointed out above. The expression ‘in any other manner’ contains general words which construed literally should receive their full and natural meaning but when they follow specific and particular words of the same genus, it will be presumed that the legislature has used the general words in a limited sense to convey the meaning implied by specific and particular words. This follows from application of Rule of ejusdem generis. That rule which is an exception to the rule of construction that general words should be given their full and natural meaning, was enunciated by Lord Campbell in R v. Edmundson, (1859) 28 J.M.C. 213, “.......where there are general words following particular and specific words, the general words must be confined to things of the same kind as those specified”. (“Craies on Statute Law” 6th Edn p. 179). These rules of interpretation are so well-settled that they hardly need any authority to support our conclusion. Now in the definition of action the expression ‘in any other manner’ follows ‘decision’, ‘recommendation’ or ‘finding’ so it connotes other categories of administrative action; it cannot be interpreted to mean actions which have no nexus to any administrative action. (Para 8)
       In this view of the matter, we are in entire agreement with the view expressed by the High Court. The appeals are devoid of any merit so they are dismissed. (Para 11)
       Result : Appeals dismissed.

Judgment

Quadri, J.—Leave is granted.

2. In these appeals, filed by the State of Karnataka against the common judgment of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court dated 2nd July, 1996 in Writ Petition No. 16857 of 1993 and Criminal Petition No. 1155 of 1993, only that part of the judgment is assailed, which deals with the interpretation of ‘action’ as defined in Section 2(1) of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act 1984 (for short “the K.L. Act”).

3. To appreciate the contentions of Mr. K.R. Nagaraja, the learned counsel for the appellants, it would be necessary to refer to the facts giving rise to these appeals. On 17.12.92, an unsigned representation containing allegations against certain government officers including the respondent, Kempaiah, an IPS Officer, who was working as Deputy Commissioner of Police, East, Bangalore, during the relevant period, was forwarded by the Under Secretary to the Governor of Karnataka to the Registrar, Lokayukta for taking necessary action. The Upalokayukta referred the allegations against the respondent to the police wing of the Upalokayukta for preliminary inquiry under Section 7(2) of the K.L. Act. Apropos to the preliminary inquiry the Upalokayukta, by letter dated 18.5.93, called for comments of the respondent under Section 9(3) of the Lokayukta Act. The respondent challenged, inter alia, the validity of the said letter in the said Writ Petition No. 16857/93. It appears that as a sequel of issuing orders of search by Upalokayukta, FIR was lodged under Section 13(1)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (for short “the P.C. Act”); in Criminal Petition No. 1155 of 1993, he prayed before the High Court to quash the proceedings under the P.C. Act. Those two cases were disposed of by the common judgment by the High Court, referred to above.

4. Mr. Nagaraja, the learned counsel for the appellants, contended that under Section 7(2) of the K.L. Act the Upalokayukta was competent to investigate into the allegation of amassing of wealth by the respondent as it would fall within the meaning of the word ‘action’ in Section 2(1) of that Act and that narrow construction of that word by the High Court would defeat the very purpose of the Act. Mr. T.V. Ratnam, the learned counsel for the respondent, submitted that the Preamble of the Act itself would show that the Act was confined to administrative actions taken by any public servant, therefore the allegation of amassing of wealth could not be an administrative action for purposes of Section 7 and the High Court had rightly interpreted that word.

5. The short point that arises for consideration is: What is the true import of the definition of ‘action’ in Section 2(1) of the K.L. Act?

6. A perusal of the provisions of the K.L. Act reveals that the object of the Act is to ensure fairness in administrative action and for that purpose it provides for investigation by Lokayukta or Upalokayukta where any complaint is made against such action by either a grievance or an allegation and for granting redress/remedy if a complainant is prejudiced by such action and/or initiating departmental proceedings or prosecution against any public servant in giving effect to the recommendations or findings of the Lokayukta or Upalokayukta, as the case may be. Section 7 deals with matters which may be investigated by the Lokayukta or Upalokayukta; Section 8 enumerates matters which cannot be investigated under the Act; Sections 9 to 11 and Rules 2 and 4 of the Karnataka Lokayukta Rules, 1985 (for short “the Rules”) prescribe procedure relating to complaints and investigations. Section 12 requires that report of investigation into the action complained of together with recommendation of Lokayukta or Upalokayukta be forwarded to the competent authority who is enjoined to take action thereon and Section 14 contemplates initiation of prosecution by Lokayukta or Upalokayukta where he is satisfied that the public servant has committed any criminal offe

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