IMPORTANT POINT
Point of time relevant for competent authority to accord sanction to prosecute under Section 19(1)(c) of Prevention of Corruption Act is the time when court is called upon to take cognizance of offence.

ORDER

K.A. Mohamed Shafi, J. - Accused 2 and 3 in C.C. No. 1/94 on the file of the Special Judge. C.B.I. Court-II. Ernakulam are the petitioners. This petition is filed to quash the entire criminal proceeding initiated against them. Petitioners 1 and 3 other accused persons were tried for the offence punishable under Ss. 419, 420, 465, 471 and 168 read with S. 120-B, IPC and S. 13(1)(d) read with S. 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, on the basis of the charge-sheet laid by the Inspector of Police, CBI/SPE, Cochin. Petitioners raised several objections before the Special Judge to the effect that the prosecution is invalid for want of proper sanction to prosecute them.

2. It is seen that the prosecution against the petitioners and other accused were launched alleging criminal conspiracy. misappropriation etc. during the period 20-6-1989 to 26-2-1990. Though all the accused raised objection regarding want of proper sanction to prosecute them, only the petitioners pressed the contention before the learned Special Judge and the learned Special Judge negatived that contention by order dated 8-8-1995. Hence this Crl. M.C. is preferred before this Court.

3. Petitioners contended that the appointing authority is the Chairman of the Cochin Shipyard. The Chairman and Managing Director delegated his powers regarding the authority to take disciplinary action including removal from service to the Chief Manager, Ship Repair Operations and Chief Manager (Personnel) and others by order dated 21-8- 1986. By order dated issued by the Deputy General Manager (Personnel) the above power has been delegated to the Deputy General Manager (Personnel) also Sanction in respect of 2nd accused in this case is issued by the Deputy General Manager (Training) on 6-4-1993 and sanction to prosecute the 3rd accused has been granted by Deputy General Manager (SR-II) on 124-1993. Therefore, the petitioners have contended' that the sanction order as contemplated under S. 19(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is not issued by the competent authority in this case since during the period the offences were alleged to have been committed the Deputy General Manager (Training) and the Deputy General Manager (SR-II) were not delegated with the authority to exercise the powers. Those contentions were negatived by the learned Special Judge.

4. It is seen that the 2nd accused was appointed as Machinist Grade 1. He was subsequently redesignated as Machinist Grade III. During the period 1989 1991, he had been working as Machinist Grade IV in 'training department. The Deputy General Manager (Training) was the head of the department in training department at that time. The Chairman, and Managing Director by Order dated 10-11-1992 delyated disciplinary powers to the Deputy General Manager (Training) passed the order of sanction of prosecution against the 2nd accused on 6-4-1993.

5. The 3rd accused was appointed as the Machinist Grade 1 by the Chairman and Managing Director, and that post was re-designated as Machinist Grade III. During the period 1989-91, he was redesignated as Machinist Grade 1. The Deputy General Manager (SR-II)was the head of the department. The Chairman and Managing Director delegated the disciplinary powers to Deputy General Manager (SR-II) by, order dt. 6-3-1992. Therefore, it is clear that the Deputy General Manager (Training) as well as the Deputy General Manager (SR-II) was competent to accord sanction for prosecution against accused 2 and 3 on 6-4-1993 and 12-4-1993 respectively, the elates on which they granted permission to prosecute them.

6. It is contended that the Deputy General Manager (Training) and Deputy General Manager (SR-II) were not delegated with the powers of disciplinary authority during the period 26-6-1986 to 26-2-1990 for which the 'petitioner are prosecuted in this case and therefore, the sanction accorded by them to prosecute the petitioner is invalid. Counsel for respondents submitted that the material point of ti