2003(3) Crimes 292 (SC)
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
(From Punjab & Haryana High Court)
Doraiswamy Raju and Arijit Pasayat, JJ.
State of Punjab —Appellant
versus
Karnail Singh —Respondent
Criminal Appeal No. 829 of 1996
Decided on 14-8-2003

IMPORTANT POINTS
(1) There is no embargo on appellate Court reviewing evidence on which order of acquittal is based.
(2) A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or merely possible doubt but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense.

Headnote:(i) Indian Penal Code, 1860—Section 302/34—Respondent-accused fired gun shot at deceased when ­deceased was out in the field at 11.30 P.M. to irrigate the field—Two brothers of deceased were eye witnesses—High Court set aside conviction holding that there was delay in lodging FIR—Appeal—Evidence to show that FIR was registered at Police Sta­tion at 9.35 a.m. reached Magistrate at 3 P.M. —Area was terrorist infected and terrorism was at its peak—Those factors rightly weighed with Trial Court while condoning delay—It could not be said there was unexplained delay in ­registration of FIR and dispatch to ­Magistrate. (Para 7)

       (ii) Indian Penal Code, 1860—Section 302—Presence of dead body and severed head of deceased in the field and tubewell of accused—If factor within special knowledge of accused was not satisfactorily explained, while considering totality of circumstances, it will be relevant factor to be consi­dered against accused. (Paras 8 to 10)

       (iii) Indian Penal Code, 1860—Section 302—Evidence of close relation witnesses—No ground to reject it—Normal discrepancies in evidence were those which were due to normal error of observation, normal error of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as shock and horror—Normal discrepancies would not corrode the credibility of the case.

       (iv) Indian Penal Code, 1860—Section 302—Rule of benefit of doubt—Prosecution is not required to meet any and every hypothesis put forward by accused—Proof beyond doubt is a guideline and not a fetish—Doubt would be called reasonable if it was free from a zest for abstract speculation.

       Held : Exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt must not nurture fanciful doubts or lingering suspicion and thereby destroy social defence. Justice cannot be made sterile on the plea that it is better to let hundred guilty escape than punish an innocent. Letting guilty escape is not doing justice according to law. [See: Gurbachan Singh v. Satpal Singh and Others [AIR 1990 SC 209]. Prosecution is not required to meet any and every hypothesis put forward by the accused. [See State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava [AIR 1992 SC 840]. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or merely possible doubt, but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case. If a case is proved perfectly, it is argued that it is artificial; if a case has some flaws inevitable because human beings are prone to err, it is argued that it is too imperfect. One wonders whether in the meticulous hypersensitivity to eliminate a rare innocent from being punished, many guilty persons must be allowed to escape. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is a guide­line, not a fetish. [See Inder Singh and Anr. v. State (Delhi Admn.) (AIR 1978 SC 1091)]. Vague hunches cannot take place of judicial evaluation. “A judge does not preside over a criminal trial, merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties.” (Per Viscount Simon in Stirland v. Director of Public Prosecution (1944 AC (PC) 315) quoted in State of U.P. v. Anil Singh (AIR 1988 SC 1998). Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any favourite other than truth. (See: Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra (1974 (1) SCR 489), State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal and Anr. (AIR 1988 SC 2154), and Gangadhar Behera and Ors. v. State of Orissa (2002 (7) Supreme 276). (Para 12)

       (v) Indian Penal Code, 1860—Section 302—Conviction by trial Court set aside in appeal by High Court—State appeal—No embargo on appellate Court reviewing evidence—Paramount consideration of Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice in prevented.

       Held : There is no embargo on the appellate Court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evi­dence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate Court to re-appreciate the evidence even where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not. [See Bhagwan Singh and Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh (JT 2002 (3) SC 387)]. The principle to be followed by appellate Court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference. These aspects were highlighted by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra (1973 (2) SCC 193), Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat (1996 (9) SCC 225) and Jaswant Singh v. State of Haryana (JT 2000 (4) SC 114). (Para 6)

       Result : Appeal allowed.