2003(3) Crimes 272 (SC)
Supreme Court of India
(From Punjab & Haryana High Court)
Doraiswamy Raju and Arijit Pasayat, JJ.
Sucha Singh & Anr. —Appellants
versus
State of Punjab —Respondent
Criminal Appeal No. 1015 of 2002
With
Criminal Appeal No. 1014 of 2002
Decided on 31-7-2003

Important Point
Merely because some of the accused persons have been acquitted though evidence against all of them, so far as direct testimony went, was the same does not lead as a necessary corollary that those who have been convicted must also be acquitted.

Headnote:(i) Indian Penal Code, 1860—Sections 302/34 and 201—Conviction of three appellants—Appeal against—Relation witnesses—PW9, his brother and a relative when returning from their fields, found accused appellants armed with various deadly weapons—All five accused persons surrounded deceased and appellant‘s’ gave two gandasa blows which hit the deceased on temple and neck—Deceased fell down—Other appellants gave kirpan blows and datar blows on his head and neck—Deceased breathed his last at the spot—Whether failure to examine any independent witnesses is fatal to prosecution case—(No)—Whether witnesses can be relied on even when two of the accused have been acquitted—(Yes)—Courts below categorically indicated distinguishing features in evidence so far as acquitted and convicted accused are concerned—Convictions recorded held legally sustainable—Evidence Act, 1872—Section 3.

       Held that the ground that the witness being a close relative and consequently being a partisan witness, should not be relied upon, has no substance. This theory was repelled by this Court as early as in Dalip Singh’s case (supra) in which surprise was expressed over the impression which prevailed in the minds of the Members of the Bar that relatives were not independent witnesses. (Para 16)

       Stress was laid by the accused-appellants on the non-acceptance of evidence tendered by some witnesses to contend about desirability to throw out entire prosecution case. In essence prayer is to apply the principle of “falsus in uno falsus in omnibus” (false in one thing, false in everything). This plea is clearly untenable. Even if major portion of evidence is found to be deficient, in case residue is sufficient to prove guilt of an accused, notwithstanding acquittal of number of other co-accused persons, his conviction can be maintained. It is the duty of Court to separate grain from chaff. Where chaff can be separated from grain, it would be open to the Court to convict an accused notwithstanding the fact that evidence has been found to be deficient to prove guilt of other accused persons. Falsity of particular material witness or material particular would not ruin it from the beginning to end. The maxim “falsus in uno falsus in omnibus” has no application in ­India and the witnesses cannot be branded as liar. The maxim “falsus in uno falsus in omnibus” has not received general acceptance nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to, is that in such cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a Court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called `a mandatory rule of evidence’. (Para 18)

       (ii) Evidence Act, 1872—Section 3—Interested witnesses—Appreciation of evidence—Relationship is not a ­factor to affect credibility of a witness—In such cases, court has to adopt a ­careful approach and analyse evidence to find out whether it is cogent and credible. (Paras 13 to 18)

       Held : As observed by this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Teja Ram and Ors. (AIR 1999 SC 1776) the over-insistence on witnesses having no relation with the victims often results in criminal justice going away. When any incident happens in a dwelling house or nearby the most natural witnesses would be the inmates of that house. It would be unpragmatic to ignore such natural witnesses and insist on outsiders who would not have even seen any thing. If the Court has discerned from the evidence or even from the investigation records that some other independent person has witnessed any event connecting the incident in question then there is justification for making adverse comments against non-examination of such person as prosecution witness. Otherwise, merely on surmises the Court should not castigate a prosecution for not examining other persons of the locality as prosecution witnesses. Prosecution can be expected to examine only those who have witnessed the events and not those who have not seen it though the neighbourhood may be replete with other residents also. (Para 19)

       (iii) Evidence Act, 1872—Section 3—Eye witnesses—Appreciation of evidence—Acquittal of some co-accused—Maxim ‘falsus in uno falsus in omnibus’, not applicable—It is merely a rule of caution—It is always open to a Court to differentiate accused who had been acquitted from those who were convicted—Evidence must be sifted with case—Indian Penal Code, 1860—Section 302/34.

       Held : Merely because some of the ­accused persons have been acquitted, though evidence against all of them, so far as direct testimony went, was the same does not lead as a necessary corollary that those who have been convicted must also be acquitted. It is always open to a Court to differentiate accused who had been acquitted from those who were convicted. (See Gurucharan Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab (AIR 1956 SC 460). The doctrine is a dangerous one specially in India for if a whole body of the testimony were to be rejected, because witness was evidently speaking an untruth in some aspect, it is to be feared that administration of criminal justice would come to a dead-stop. Witnesses just cannot help in giving embroidery to a story, however, true in the main. Therefore, it has to be appraised in each case as to what extent the evidence is worthy of acceptance, and merely because in some respects the Court considers the same to be insufficient for placing reliance on the testimony of a witness, it does not necessarily follow as a matter of law that it must be disregarded in all respects as well. The evidence has to be shifted with care. The aforesaid dictum is not a sound rule for the reason that one hardly comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggeration, embroideries or embellishment. (See Sohrab s/o Beli Nayata and Anr. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (1972 (3) SCC 751) and Ugar Ahir and Ors. v. The State of Bihar (AIR 1965 SC 277). An attempt has to be made to, as noted above, in terms of felicitous metaphor, separate grain from the chaff, truth from falsehood. Where it is not feasible to separate truth from falsehood. Where it is not feasible to separate truth from falsehood, because grain and chaff are inextricably mixed up, and in the process of separation an absolutely new case has to be reconstructed by divorcing essential details presented by the prosecution completely from the context and the background against which they are made, the only available course to be made is to discard the evidence in toto. (Para 18)

       (iv) Evidence Act, 1872—Section 3—Appreciation of evidence—Discrepancies and contradictions—Courts have to label the category to which a discrepancy may be categorized—While normal discrepancies do not corrode credibility of a party’s case, material discrepancies do so. (Para 18)

       (v) Evidence Act, 1872—Section 3 —Eye witnesses—Witnesses unarmed while assailants armed with deadly weapons—Inaction in not coming to rescue of deceased—Not a ground for discarding their evidence. (Para 23)

       Result : Appeals dismissed.