Important Point
Accused can not claim right to cross examine approver before Committal Court.

COMMON ORDER

M. Karpagavinayagam, J.—The only point raised in these three revision cases filed by the State challenging the common order passed by the trial Court dated 18.7.2003 is that the impugned order granting permission to the accused to cross-examine the approver even before the committal, is clearly wrong as the same is against the purpose of Sec-tion 306(4) Cr.P.C.

2. I have heard the Public Prose-cutor as well as the counsel for the respondent.

3. This case relates to the offences under Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, Section 27 of the Arms Act, Sections 4 and 6 of the Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986, Sections 5 and 6 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act and Sections 120-B, 506 and 397 I.P.C.

4. Several bail applications have been filed by the respondents and the same have been dismissed by this Court directing for expeditious committal by the committal Court and expeditious trial by the Sessions Court. At that stage, the accused 1 to 3 filed separate applications before the committal Court seeking that when an approver has been examined before the committal Court, the accused must be given opportunity to cross-examine the approver. The said request was objected to by the prosecutor on the basis of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ranadhir Basu v. State of W.B.1. However, the said applications were allowed by the committal Court mainly on the reason that allowing the accused to cross-examine the approver before the Committal Court would enable the committal Court to finish the committal proceeding soon and commit to the Sessions Court.

5. On a perusal of the impugned common order, it is noticed that the committal Court though would refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in 2000 S.C.C. (Cri) 587 (cited supra), where it has been held that the accused cannot be given any permission to cross-examine the approver before the committal Court, chose to grant permission subject to some condition. The relevant observation of the Apex Court is as follows:

“From this observation it does not follow that the person who is granted pardon must be examined in the presence of the accused and that the accused has a right to appear and cross-examine him at that stage also. As pointed out by this Court in that case the object is to provide an opportunity to the accused to show to the Court that the approver’s evidence at the trial is untrust-worthy in view of the contradictions or improvements made by him during his evidence at the trial. Considering the object and purpose of examining the person accepting tender of pardon as a witness is thus limited. The proceeding which takes place before the Magistrate at that stage is neither an inquiry nor a trial. Therefore, the submission of the learned counsel that Sudipa should have been examined as a witness in open court and not in the chamber and that while she was examined the Magistrate should have kept the accused present and afforded to them an opportunity to cross­-examine Sudipa cannot be accepted. The phrase “examination of a witness” does not necessarily mean examination and cross-exa-mination of that witness. What type of examination of a witness is contemplated would depend upon the object and purpose of that provision. Section 202 Cr.P.C. also contemp-lates examination of witness yet it has been held, considering the object and purpose of that provision, that the accused has no locus standi at that stage.”

6. On a reading of the above observation, it is clear that the ratio decided by the Supreme Court is that the commit-tal proceeding which takes place before the committal Court at that stage is neither an enquiry nor a trial. There-fore, the contention that the accused must be given opportunity to cross-examine in the committal Court when the approver is examined cannot be accepted. The phrase “examination of a witness” does not mean examination and cross-examination of that witness. Therefore, it is clear that the a