Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation

Advocates:
Counsel for the Parties:
for the Appellant:K.N. Diwakar, Advocate.
For the Respondent: Rakesh Kumar, GA-9.

IMPORTANT POINT
When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is further sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life, such sentence would commence at the expiration of imprisonment to which he was previously sentence, unless the Court directs that the subsequent sentenced shall run concurrently with previous sentence.

Headnote:Criminal Procedure Code, 1973— Sections 427, 428, 432 and 433—Writ petition for amalgamation of conviction of two cases—Petitioner was convicted in two cases of murder—In a case in Delhi of 1989 he was convicted on 2.7.1993 and in a case of Bihar of 1989 he was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment on 20.3.1999—He was in custody since 18th Aug, 1989—When arrested in Delhi murder case—In Bihar murder case he was taken into custody on 18th December, 1994—Accused was summoned once through production warrants in Bihar case on 4th October 1989 but he was produced in Bihar case on 19th September 1994 and on that date he was taken into custody and sent to jail in Bihar case—A person was deemed to be in custody in a particular case when he was specifically remanded in judicial custody in that case—CrP.C. did not provide for amalgamation of convictions—Convict however awarded life imprisonment in two different cases, was to suffer sentences concurrently in both cases—It one was detained in several cases, he could be entitled to set off in as many cases from the date he was detained in particular case and not prove to it.
       Held: Now the core issue is whether Petitioner would be deemed to be in custody in Bihar case from 4th October, 1989 when the production warrant was issued by Raxaul Court on 18th December, 1994 or the date 18th December, 1994 when he was taken into custody and remanded in the Bihar case on production from Tihar Jail. A person is deemed to be in custody in a particular case when he is specifically remanded in judicial custody in that case. A person is remanded to the custody in a particular case generally only on his physical appearance either being brought before the Court on arrest or on suo motto surrendering. In exceptional case a Magistrate b issuance of custody warrant can take a person in judicial custody if one is convalescing in hospital and despite best efforts he/she cannot be brought before court on account of physical infirmity/disability. In such case, he has to be brought to the Court at the earliest even on stretcher etc. A person who is accused in more than one case would be deemed to be in custody in those cases only when is taken into custody in each of the cases specifically by speaking Order.
       Section 267 of the Code provides for making an order for production of a person for answering to the charge or for purpose of appearing in a proceeding for giving evidence. Such Order requiring a person to be produced in the Court concerned from custody consequent to detention in another case is ordinarily referred to as issuance of production warrant. The aforesaid provision dies not refer to taking a person in custody in the required Case. As such a person against whom the production warrant is issued cannot be deemed to be in custody in the case merely by issuance of such warrant.
       Section 167(2) of the speaks about authorizing detention of Prisoner in custody during course of investigation. Sections 209 and 309 authorize the remand of accused to custody during enquiry and trial subject to provision of bail. From reading of aforesaid provisions it would be clear that issuance of mere production warrant would not amount to taking a person in custody in that case, As such, the custody of the petitioner would be reckoned only from 18th December, 1994 when he was formally arrested and remaded to jail.
       Learned Counsel for the petitioner has prayed for amalgamation of conviction of both cases. The criminal law does not conceive of any such feature like amalgamation of conviction. Section 427 of the Code deals with the sentence infected on subsequent convocation on and offender who is already undergoing sentence in another offence. Section 427 (1) speaks that when a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is further sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life, such sentence would commence at the expiration of imprisonment to which he was previously sentence, unless the Court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with previous sentence. Section 427 (2) of the code is relevant here which is quoted herein:
       When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for life is sentenced on subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence.
       This provision of law mandates that if a person is convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment in two different cases, then both the sentence would run concurrently. In this respect on formal Order of the court is needed or required and the subsequent sentence of imprisonment would run concurrently with the earlier sentence. In other words. Section 427 of the Code indicates that the sentence of life imprisonment impoed on the same person in two different convictions would converge into one from the date of latter imprisonment and thereafter, it would flow through one stream alone. Section 427 of the Code intended to provide amelioration to the Petitioner. Thus, Section 427 of the Code provides for convergence of sentence of convictions and there is nothing like amalgamation of conviction. As such, the prayer of the petitioner is misconceived. (Paras 7 to 10)
       Result: Petition disposed of.