2009(3) Crimes 473(A.P.)
ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
P. Swaroop Reddy, J.
Smt. Menakuru Renuka and Ors. –Petitioners
versus
Smt. Menakuru Mohan Reddy
and Anr. –Respondents
Criminal Petition No. 4106/08
Decided on 22-10-2008

IMPORTANT POINT
Female members cannot be made respondents in proceedings under protection of women from Domestic Violence Act.

Headnote:Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005—Section 2(q), (f)—Complaint under Section 12 of the Act claiming relief under Sections 18, 19 and 20 of the Act—Respondents in complaint were the parents-in-law and sister-in-law of complainant—Petition to quash complaint on plea that women are not liable and reliefs that were being claimed could be granted against husband only—Whether proceedings under the Act were maintainable against women in view of Section 2(q) of the Act? No. Whether reliefs claimed by complainant were maintainable against petitioners?—Reliefs were maintainable against petitioner No. 2 i.e. father-in-law.

       Held: Thus, the section says “respondent” means any adult male person, thereby excluding women altogether; but the proviso provides for filing complaint against the relatives of the husband or a male partner. In view of the same, the learned senior counsel appearing for the first respondent wife contends that women are also liable.

       As contended, the proviso to Section 2(q) is giving scope for including female relatives of the husband also. Here, any doubt as to whether a female relative can be included, perhaps, is clear from the main Section 2 (q), it covers, the persons having domestic relationship.

       As per Section 2 (f) of the Act, “domestic relation” would “include persons that any time lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as joint family.”

       Thus, this would cover close members of the husband’s family like mother-in-law, sister-in-law, co-sisters etc. Thus, thereby excluding them (female members of the domestic relationship) from being the respondents, when the section says adult male persons of the domestic relationship are included, female members of the domestic relationship have to be automatically excluded or else Section 2(q) of the Act would have been “respondent” means “any adult person” instead of “and adult male person”. Thus, the question a selfsame female member in domestic relationship excluded as respondent in view of the contents of the main provision again being included under the proviso to the section may not arise. Therefore, it has to be treated that the proviso intends to include only male persons other than those in domestic relationship also. There appears to be unintentional omission to specifically excluding women in the proviso or it may be because main Section makes it clear that only male persons can be respondents, it is not again specified in the proviso. (Paras 10 to 13)

       As per Section 2 (a) of the Act, “aggrieved person” means any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent. As per Section 2 (f) “domestic relationship” as already referred is “a relationship between two persons, who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family. Thus, when Section 2 (a) and (f) of the Act are read together, a case of Domestic Violence can be filed by any woman in Domestic relationship, not only by the wife. Wife is generally taken as the wife of the main respondent, who again is, mostly, a son in the family. The abovereferred Clause 4(1) of the statement of objects and reasons and Section 2(a) of the Act clarifies that even those women, who are sisters, widows, mothers and single women, living with the abuser are entitled to legal protection under the Act. Thus aggrieved sisters and mothers also can file a DVC and when the intention of the Act is to prevent any female relation of the husband or the male partner to file a DVC against the wife or the female partner, when a DVC is filed by a wife against the brother of her husband, when a sister or mother filed a DVC under the Act against several male members of the family, the question would be who would be wife or female partner that would be entitled to immunity. In such an event, all the wives against whose husbands the DVCs are filed are obviously entitled to immunity. Here, a question may arise as to when DVC is filed only against a female without including her husband like the third petitioner herein or against unmarried girls, what would be the position. My answer is, the intention of the Act is to altogether exclude women, when most women are excluded there is no question of the Act intending to include people like unmarried girls. Thus, it appears that the intention of the Act is to exclude women altogether. (Para 15)

       In view of my above discussion, I hold that female members cannot be made respondents in the proceedings under the Act. (Para 20)

       Coming to the question of the reliefs claimed by the first respondent before the trial court under Sections 18 to 22 of the Act are concerned—Section 18 of the Act deals with grant of a protection order from domestic violence; from alienating any assets, operating bank lockers etc. which can be definitely granted against the present second petitioner—father-in-law. An order under Section 19, an order for residence can also be granted against the second petitioner. The reliefs under Sections 20 and 22 also can be granted against the second petitioner, father-in-law. (Para 21)

       In view of the above finding, as the question of maintainability of the proceedings against the female members is held in favour of petitioner Nos. 1 and 3 herein, holding that proceedings under the Act are not maintainable against the female members, the proceedings are liable to be quashed, as far as petitioner Nos.1 and 3 herein are concerned. Accordingly, the present petition is allowed to the extent of petitioner Nos.1 and 3, quashing the proceedings pending against them in D.V.C. No.1 of 2008 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Pulivendula, Kadapa District. The petition insofar as it relates to the second petitioner is hereby dismissed. (Para 23)