Back
2010(3) Crimes 273 (Raj.)
RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Prakash Tatia, H.R. Panwar and Dinesh Maheshwari, JJ.
Ishwar Lal Khatri —Petitioner
versus
State of Rajasthan —Respondent
Cri. Misc. Application No. 1905 of 2009
Decided on 9.2.2010
Counsel for the Parties:
For the Petitioner:Mr. Vijay Purohit, Advocate.
For the Respondent: Mr. B.K. Mehar, Public Prosecutor.
IMPORTANT POINT
Prescribing a period of limitation for seeking relief from courts is a policy in the interest of public and if bar of limitation is treated as mere technical objection then consequences will be grave.
Headnote:Limitation Act, 1963—Section 3 and 5—Criminal Procedure Code, 1973—Section 96(1) and 99A—Notification dated 5.8.1957 issued by State Government forfeiting two publications opening said publications were intended to promote hatred in different classes of citizen and were maliciously intended to outrage religious feelings of the Jain Community—Petition challenging said notification after 45 years—Limitation provided was two months—Whether the Court could ignore period of limitation by looking into broader aspect? No—No Court had power to ignore the law—Whether bar created by Limitation Act was only technical matter? No—Prescribing of limitation period for a relief from Courts was a policy in the interest of public—Whether petitioner deserved an opportunity now to move an application under Section 5 of Limitation Act? No, in view of the conduct of petitioner that six years had passed since petition was filed.
JUDGMENT
Prakash Tatia, J.—Heard learned counsel for the petitioner.
The State Government by exercising power under Section 99A of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1808 (which as in force at relevant time) forfeited two publications namely, ‘Jagat Hitkarini’ and ‘Atm Puran’ after opining that the said publications (books) are intended to promote the feeling and hatred in different classes of citizen of India and are berately and maliciously intended to outrage religious feelings of the Jain (Bania) community by insulting the religion and the religious of that class and the publication of work punishable under Section 153A and 295 of Indian Penal Code. To give effect to the intention of the State Government to forfeit the said publication (books) a notification was published in gazette of the Rajasthan dated 5.8.1957, copy of which has been placed on record by the petitioner.
2. The petitioner has challenged the said notification dated 5.8.1997 after about 45 years from the date of the said notification, whereas as per Section 99A which was in notice at time of publication of notification dated 5.8.1997 as well as under sub-section (1) of Section 96 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (which is in force now), the period of notifciation for challenge to such notification is two months on the date of publication of notification in official gazette. The petitioner was well aware that period of notification is two months only and the petitioner took a plea that prescribing period of limitation of two months for challenge to said notification in Section 96(1) Cr.P.C., 1973 is arbitrary and unreasonable and violative of Article 104 of the Constitution of India and submitted this petition without any application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay at about 45 years.
3. To meet with the objection of the bar of limitation, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the court may look into the broader aspect and may ignore the period of limitation prescribed in sub-section (1) of Section 96 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Learned counsel for the petitioner though took this plea but could not substantiate it by his own arguments nor with the help of any precedent on this point.
4. We may observe here that it is not necessary that every new plea based on the point of law must find support from judicial precedent, but if entirely new plea is taken in arguments then there must be some reasons and justification for the new plea which may find support from law express or may have even implied support of law or at least must stand to logic. However, learned counse1 for the petitioner frankly stated that he has nothing more than to state that court may look into broader aspect of freedom of speech, expression and right to trade protected by law and because of issue involved in this petition the period of petition prescribed by law may be ignored.
5. It will be beneficial to quote sub-section (1) of Section 3of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963.
“3. Bar of limitation: (1) Subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not set up as a defense.”
Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 mandates that if the suit, appeal or application is submitted after prescribed period of limitation then such suit, appeal or application, as the case may be, is required to be dismissed even when objection of period of limitation has not been set up as defence. The Hon’ble Privy Counsel in the case of Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. v. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and Or.1 considered the issue whether any judicial decision would enable the court to relieve the parties from the operation of the Limitation Act. The Hon’ble Privy Council held as under:
“In their Lordships opinion it is impossible to hold that in a matter which is governed by
