SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Dipak Misra, Prafulla C. Pant, JJ.
Mrs. Priyanka Srivastava and Another — Appellants
versus
State of U.P. and Others — Respondents
Criminal Appeal No.781 of 2012
Decided on : 19-03-2015
(2012) 10 SCC 517 – Relied upon
(b) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 156(3) – Magistrate passing order for registering FIR by simply narrating the allegations – No application of mind – Not permissible. (Para 17)
(c) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 156(3) – Magistrate directing, ‘as per the application’, to register FIR – Not applying his mind as to nature of allegations – Matter is already proceeding under SARFAESI Act – Also there is elaborate procedures under Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 – All these required more care, caution and circumspection in passing the order – Impugned order not sustainable. (Paras 25, 26)
(1976) 3 SCC 252; (2013) 10 SCC 705; (2007) 12 SCC 496; (2005) 7 SCC 467; Crl. Appeal No. 600 of 2007; (2014) 2 SCC 1 – Relied upon
(d) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 156(3) – Abuse of the provision – Need to control – Directions given – Application u/s 156(3) should be filed after availing recourse to section 154(1) and 154(3) – Application u/s 156(3) must be supported by an affidavit giving details of availing provisions of section 154(1) and 154(3) – Magistrate should also verify veracity of the affidavit filed with application u/s 156(3). (Para 27)
(2014) 2 SCC 1 – Relied upon
(e) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 156(3) – Magistrate ought to have kept in mind the provision of section 32 of the SARFAESI Act protecting actions taken in good faith. (Para 29)
Result : Appeal allowed.
Crux: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal by bank officials against a Magistrate's order under Section 156(3) CrPC directing registration of an FIR for alleged forgery and undervaluation of property in SARFAESI Act proceedings, quashing FIR No. 298/2011 (PS Bhelupur, Varanasi). The Court held that Magistrates must apply judicial mind to allegations before issuing such directions, rather than mechanically forwarding applications, especially where statutory remedies exist under SARFAESI and RDBFI Acts, and actions taken in good faith are protected under Section 32 of SARFAESI. (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) [5000271120016][5000271120017][5000271120024][5000271120025][5000271120030][5000271120031]
To curb routine abuse of Section 156(3), applications must detail prior recourse to Sections 154(1) and 154(3) CrPC, be supported by an affidavit (making filers accountable for falsity), and Magistrates must verify veracity, exercising greater caution in commercial/financial disputes like SARFAESI matters.[5000271120027]
In revisions against Magistrate orders dismissing complaints (under Sections 200/202/203), affected parties are entitled to hearing per Section 401(2). (!) (!) (!) (!)
The borrower was condemned for filing multiple complaints post-default to pressure officials into one-time settlements without withdrawing cases, bypassing civil remedies. (!) [5000271120002][5000271120003][5000271120007][5000271120008][5000271120016][5000271120025]
Directions issued to circulate the judgment to High Courts/Sessions Judges/Magistrates for vigilant exercise of Section 156(3).[5000271120032]
JUDGMENT
Dipak Misra, J. — The present appeal projects and frescoes a scenario which is not only disturbing but also has the potentiality to create a stir compelling one to ponder in a perturbed state how some unscrupulous, unprincipled and deviant litigants can ingeniously and innovatively design in a nonchalant manner to knock at the doors of the Court, as if, it is a laboratory where multifarious experiments can take place and such skillful persons can adroitly abuse the process of the Court at their own will and desire by painting a canvas of agony by assiduous assertions made in the application though the real intention is to harass the statutory authorities, without any remote remorse, with the inventive design primarily to create a mental pressure on the said officials as individuals, for they would not like to be dragged to a court of law to face in criminal cases, and further pressurize in such a fashion so that financial institution which they represent would ultimately be constrained to accept the request for “one-time settlement” with the fond hope that the obstinate defaulters who had borrowed money from it would withdraw the cases instituted against them. The facts, as we proceed to adumbrate, would graphically reveal how such persons, pretentiously aggrieved but potentially dangerous, adopt the self-convincing mastery methods to achieve so. That is the sad and unfortunate factual score forming the fulcrum of the case at hand, and, we painfully recount.
2. The facts which need to be stated are that the respondent No.3, namely, Prakash Kumar Bajaj, son of Pradeep Kumar Bajaj, had availed a housing loan from the financial institution, namely, Punjab National Bank Housing Finance Limited (PNBHFL) on 21st January, 2001, vide housing loan account No.IHL-583. The loan was taken in the name of the respondent No.3 and his wife, namely, Jyotsana Bajaj. As there was default in consecutive payment of the installments, the loan account was treated as a Non-Performing Asset (NPA) in accordance with the guidelines framed by the Reserve Bank of India. The authorities of the financial institution issued notice to the borrowers under Section 13(2) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, (for short, 'the SARFAESI Act') and in pursuance of the proceedings undertaken in the said Act, the PNBHFL, on 5th June, 2007, submitted an application before the District Magistrate, Varanasi, U.P. for taking appropriate action under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act.
3. At this juncture, the respondent No.3 preferred W.P. No.44482 of 2007, which was dismissed by the High Court on 14th September, 2007, with the observation that it was open to the petitioner therein to file requisite objection and, thereafter, to take appropriate action as envisaged under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. After the dismissal of the writ petition with the aforesaid observation, the respondent No.3, possibly nurturing the idea of self-centric Solomon’s wisdom, filed a Criminal Complaint Case No.1058 of 2008, under Section 200 Cr.P.C. against V.N. Sahay, Sandesh Tiwari and V.K. Khanna, the then Vice-President, Assistant President and the Managing Director respectively for offences punishable under Sections 163, 193 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was alleged in the application that the said accused persons had intentionally taken steps to cause injury to him. The learned Magistrate vide order dated 4th October, 2008, dismissed the criminal complaint and declined to take cognizance after recording the statement of the complainant under Section 200 Cr.P.C. and examining the witnesses under Section 202 Cr.P.C.
4. Being grieved by the aforesaid order, the respondent No.3 preferred a Revision Petition No.460 of 2008, which was eventually heard by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Varanasi, U.P. The learned Additional Sessions Judge after adumbrating the facts and taking note of the submi
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