SHIB SADHAN SADHU
Ramrahit Singh – Appellant
Versus
Dhananjoy Singh @ Motu – Respondent
The legal document emphasizes that under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, only the designated Special Court has the exclusive authority to try offences under the Act, entertain applications for bail, and deal with incidental matters such as detention and remand of the accused (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) .
Specifically, the Act grants the Special Court the authority to take cognizance of offences based on complaints or police reports without the need for prior committal or trial orders, and such powers are not conferred upon Magistrates (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) (!) .
Furthermore, the Act explicitly states that its provisions are in addition to and override any conflicting laws, reinforcing that the jurisdiction to entertain bail applications in offences under the Act rests solely with the Special Court. Magistrates, while empowered to make initial remand orders under general criminal procedure, do not have the jurisdiction to consider or pass orders related to bail or subsequent remand in cases under the Act once the offence is registered and the case is within the domain of the Special Court (!) (!) (!) (!) .
The document also clarifies that granting bail by a Magistrate in such cases, when the Special Court is empowered to do so, is illegal and can be challenged on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, illegality, and perversity. Orders passed without proper jurisdiction are considered perverse and liable to be annulled, and such orders do not have any bearing on the subsequent trial process (!) (!) (!) (!) .
In conclusion, the legal framework establishes that the powers related to trial, bail, and remand in offences under the POCSO Act are exclusively vested in the Special Court, and any orders by other courts in this regard are without jurisdiction and subject to being set aside (!) (!) (!) (!) .
JUDGMENT
Shib Sadhan Sadhu, J.—By preferring the present application under Section 401 read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (hereinafter referred to as Cr.P.C. for brevity) the petitioner has prayed that the order dated 15.07.2014 passed by the Learned Additional Sessions Judge, 2nd Court, Burdwan in Criminal Misc. Case No.4027 of 2013, thereby dismissing the revision and affirming the order dated 29.07.2013 passed by the Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Asansol in G.R. Case No.1366 of 2013 in respect of granting of bail of the O.P. No.1 be quashed and set aside.
2. The factual matrix which gave rise to the present application is as follows:
An offence was registered being No.40/13 dated 01.06.2013 under the provisions of Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (hereinafter referred to as POCSO Act for brevity) and Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code against Dhananjoy Singh @ Motu (O.P.No.1 herein).
3. As per the F.I.R. lodged on 01.06.2013 the petitioner on 20.05.2013 went to his native place in Bihar keeping his two minor sons and the minor daughter aged about 13 years 4 months 16 days (victim girl) in his hou
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