KERALA HIGH COURT
B .M. Thulasidas, J.
Poornasree Agencies- Petitioners
versus
Universal Enterprises & Anr. - Respondents
Criminal Misc. Case No. 132 of 1994
Decided on 6-1-1995
Counsel for the parties:
For the Petitioner: A.K. Srinivasan & N.S. Mohd. Usman.
For the Respondents: K.I. Abdul Rashid & K. Surendra Mohan.
IMPORTANT POINT
In view of special provisions in the Negotiable Instruments Act, period prescribed there alone can be taken into account for purpose of limitation.
Headnote:Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Sections 138 & 142(a) - Limitation for filing complaint for offence under - Cheque bounced & demand notice served on petitioner on 9.6.1993 - Excluding that date payment was to be made within 15 days which would expire on 24-6-1993 - Limitation of one month for filing complaint started from 25.6.1993 - Complaint ought to have been filed before 24-7-1993 Complaint filed on 27.7.1993, though 25-7-1993 was holiday, is beyond time & cognizance was barred - Proceedings are unsustainable, liable to be quashed. (Para 7)
Result: Petition allowed.
Mr. B.M. Thulasidas, J.- Petitioner is the accused in S.T. No. 2077 of 1993 of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate Court, Emakulam. In the complaint filed by the first respondent commission of an offence under Sec. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act had been alleged against him who is the Proprietor of M/s. Poornasree Agencies. Towards the debt that was allegedly due a cheque dt. 7.2.1993 for Rs. 5,011.50/- was issued by the petitioner to the respondent on 1.2. 1993. It was presented for collection through State Bank of India, Perumanoor branch on 14.5.1993 and on 2.6.1993 he had information from the bank that the cheque had been dishonoured for want of sufficient funds. Thereupon the first respondent sent a demand notice dated 7.6.1993, which the petitioner received on 9.6.1993 but failed to make the payment. Thereupon, Annexure A complaint was filed on 26.7.1993 for offence under Sec. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Pursuant to the summons petitioner appeared and he filed M.P. 9020 of 1993, copy of which is Annex. B raising a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the complaint. The Court below however by the impugned order dismissed the petition by Annexure C order. It is submitted that the order is untenable, that the complaint is barred by limitation, that the proceedings in the case are unsustainable and have to be quashed.
2. Heard Counsel for the petitioner and the respondents.
3. Under Sec. 142(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act a complaint under Sec. 142(a) has to be made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under Clause (c) of proviso to Sec. 138 to apply which under Clause (a) of the proviso the cheque "has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity whichever is earlier", and under clause (b): "the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque as the case may be makes a demand for payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as paid"; and under clause (c): "the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case' may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice".
4. In the complaint it was stated that notice was received by the petitioner on 9.6.1993 and therefore, payment had to be made within 15 days thereof. Obviously the 15 days will commence from 10.6.1993 and would expire on 24.6.1993. The complaint has to be filed within one month of the date on which the cause of action arose. Here in this case the cause of action had arisen on and after 24.6.1993 and the complaint has therefore to be filed on or before 24.7.1993. The complaint was however filed on 26.7.1993 stating that the last day for filing it, which according to the respondent was 25.7.1993, was a holiday and therefore it could be legally filed on the next working day i.e. 26.7.1993. I am unable to agree to the correctness of this contention. The complaint in my view ought to have been filed on or before 24.7.1993 and since it was not so filed, but was filed on 26.7.93, it was barred by limitation.
5. Petitioner's Counsel relied upon a decision of the House of Lords in Dodds v. Walker1, to submit that the complaint filed was within time. That was a case decided under the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1954, whereunder Sec. 29(3):
"No application (for a new tenancy) under Sec. 24(1) of this Act shall be entertained unless it is made not less than two or more than four months after the giving of the landlord's notice under Sec. 25 of the Act."
6. On September 30, the landlord gave notice to the tenant to determine his tenancy of business premises. Under Sec. 29(3) of the Act the tenant had "four months after the giving of the landlord's notice" to app