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Supreme Court of India
(From Punjab and Haryana High Court)
Arijit Pasayat & S.H. Kapadia, JJ.
M/s. Prem Chand Vijay Kumar —Appellant
versus
Yash Pal Singh and Anr. —Respondents
Criminal Appeal No. 651 of 2005
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 1507 of 2004)
Decided on 2-5-2005

Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellant :Hiren Dasan, Chanchal Kumar Ganguli and Rajnish Gupta, Advocates.
For the Respondents:Amit Singh Chhadha and Pradeep Kumar Bakshi, Advocates.

Important point
Once a notice u/s 138 (b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act is received by the drawer of the cheque, payee or holder of cheque forfeits his right to present the cheque again to create fresh cause of action after expiry of first cause of action pursuant to first notice.

Headnote:Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 —Sections 138 and 142—Prosecution for dishonour of cheque—Cause of action within the meaning of Section 142(c) of the Act arises and can arise only once—Cheque issued in favour of complainant-appellant was dishonoured due to insufficient funds on 6.2.1995 and complainant issued demand notice on 17.2.1995 and amount was not paid—As requested by respondents-accused cheque was presented again on 6.7.1995 and was again dishonoured and again lawyer’s notice was sent on 24.7.1995 and then present complaint was filed—High Court in exercise of it’s power u/s 482 Cr.P.C. quashed complaint—Appeal—Once notice u/s 138 (b) of the Act was received by the drawer of the cheque, payee or holder of the cheque forfeited his right to present the cheque again—It was not permissible for a payee to create another cause of action with same cheque—Impugned judgment did not suffer from any infirmity.

       Held : Clause (a) of the proviso to Section 138 does not put any embargo upon the payee to successively present a dis­honoured cheque during the period of its ­validity. This apart, in the course of business transactions it is not uncommon for a cheque being returned due to insufficient funds or similar such reasons and being presented again by the payee after sometime, on his own volition or at the request of the drawer, in expectation that it would be encashed. The primary interest of the payee is to get his money and not prosecution of the drawer, recourse to which, normally, is taken out of compulsion and not choice. On each presentation of the cheque and its dishonour, a fresh right-and not a cause of action - accrues in his favour. He may, therefore, ­without taking pre-emptory action in exercise of his such right under clause (b) of ­Section 138, go on presenting the cheque so as to enable him to exercise such right at any point of time during the validity of the cheque. But once he gives a notice under clause (b) of Section 138, he forfeits such right in case of failure of the drawer to pay the money within the stipulated time, he would be liable for offence and the cause of action for filing the complaint will arise. (Paras 8 and 9)

       Clause (b) of Section 142 gives it a restrictive meaning, in that, it refers to only one fact which will give rise to the cause of action and that is the failure to make the payment within 15 days from the date of the receipt of the notice. A combined reading of Sections 138 and 142 makes it clear that cause of action is to be reckoned accordingly. The combined reading of the above two sections of the Act leaves no room for doubt that cause of action within the meaning of Section 142(c) arises - and can arise - only once. The period of one month for filing the complaint will be reckoned from the day immediately following the day on which the period of fifteen days from the date of the receipt of the notice by the drawer expires. As noted in Sadanandan Bhadran’s case (supra) once a notice under clause (b) of Section 138 of the Act is “received” by the drawer of the cheque, the payee or holder of the cheque forfeits his right to again present the cheque as cause of action has accrued when there was failure to pay the amount within the prescribed period and the period of limitation starts to run which cannot be stopped on any account. One of the indispensable factors to form the cause of action envisaged in Section 138 of the Act is contained in clause (b) of the proviso to that section. It involves the making of a demand by giving a notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque “within fifteen days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid”. If no such notice is given within the said period of 15 days, no cause of action could have been created at all. Thus, it is well settled that if dishonour of a cheque has once snowballed into a cause of action it is not permissible for a payee to create another cause of action with the same cheque. (Paras 10 to 14)

       Result : Appeal dismissed.

       

Judgement Key Points

Certainly. Based on the provided legal document, here are the key points:

  1. Once a notice under Section 138(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act is received by the drawer of the cheque, the payee or holder forfeits the right to present the same cheque again to create a new cause of action after the initial cause of action has arisen due to the first notice (!) (!) .

  2. The act of presenting a dishonoured cheque multiple times during its validity period does not constitute multiple causes of action; rather, each presentation is a right that can be exercised, but the cause of action is singular and arises only once when the legal notice is received and the drawer fails to pay within the prescribed period (!) (!) .

  3. The cause of action within the meaning of Section 142(c) arises only once, and the period for filing a complaint is to be counted from the day after the expiry of the fifteen-day period from the receipt of the legal notice, after which the right to file a complaint is barred (!) (!) .

  4. The receipt of the legal notice by the drawer is a crucial event; once the notice is received, the payee forfeits the right to present the cheque again to establish a new cause of action, even if the cheque is dishonoured multiple times (!) (!) .

  5. The period of limitation for filing a complaint is strictly one month from the day following the expiry of the fifteen-day period after receipt of the legal notice, and this period cannot be extended or stopped once the cause of action has arisen (!) (!) .

  6. The primary purpose of successive presentations of a cheque is to recover the amount owed, not to establish multiple causes of action; each presentation does not reset or extend the cause of action once the initial legal notice has been received and the period has expired (!) (!) .

  7. It is not permissible for the payee to create a new cause of action with the same cheque after the initial cause has been established through proper legal notice and the failure of the drawer to pay within the stipulated period (!) .

  8. The legal framework emphasizes that the cause of action is singular and that subsequent presentations or notices do not revive or create new causes of action once the original has been forfeited by receipt of the legal notice and the expiry of the prescribed period (!) (!) .

Please let me know if you need further assistance or clarification.


Judgment

Arijit Pasayat, J.—Leave granted.

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the legality of the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court holding that the proceedings initiated on the basis of a complaint alleging infraction of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 (in short the ‘Act’) was not maintainable. Therefore, the proceedings were quashed, allowing the petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short ‘the Code’).

3. Background facts filtering out unnecessary details are as under:

The complaint was filed by the appellant alleging that in the year 1995 respondent No.1 had issued a cheque for a sum of Rs. 5,15,053.72 representing balance amount payable to the appellant for supply of goods to a partnership firm of which respondents are partners. It was indicated that the total amount payable was Rs. 49,21,482.72 as against which the accused persons had paid Rs. 44,06,429/-, leaving balance of Rs. 5,15,053.72. A cheque [drawn on Oriental Bank of Commerce, Ladwa branch (Account No. 954)] was issued for the same amount on 27.1.1995. The cheque was signed by respondent No.1 Yashpal Singh, for the firm and respondent No.2 Nirpal Singh, was a partner of the partnership firm, namely, M/s Sat Guru Rice Traders, New Delhi. The cheque was dishonoured due to inadequacy of funds in the account. Intimation was given on 6.2.1995. Notice was issued by the appellant demanding payment by lawyer’s notice dated 17.2.1995. The amount was not paid. The respondents requested the appellant for some time to make the payment. On the request of the respondents, the cheque was again presented on 6.7.1995 and it was again dishonoured due to inadequacy of funds. Intimation in this regard was sent to the appellant on 10.7.1995. Again, lawyer’s notice was sent on 24.7.1995. Reply was sent by the respondents on 16.8.1995 refuting the allegations contained in the legal notice. The complaint was lodged on 28.8.1995. Charges were framed.

4. Respondent filed an application for discharge which was dismissed by the trial court by order dated 29.1.2002. The order was challenged before the High Court which by the impugned judgment held that the requirements of Section 142 of the Act were not met.

5. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the High Court was not right in entertaining the petition under Section 482 of the Code. The High Court lost sight of the fact that the application was filed by the respondents long after the charges were framed. High Court has erroneously placed reliance on this Court’s decision in Sadanandan Bhadran v. Madhavan Sunil Kumar (1998 (6) SCC 514). On the contrary, the decision in Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. v. Galaxy Traders & Agencies Ltd. and Ors. (2001 (6) SCC 463) is applicable. The period of limitation has to be reckoned from 10.8.1995 i.e. the date on which the respondents-accused persons replied to the legal notice dated 24.7.1995. As the complaint was filed on 28.8.1995 the same was well within time. It was submitted that the respondent-­accused persons categorically stated in their reply­ dated 10.8.1995 that the first notice had not been served on them.

6. Learned counsel for the respondent-accused persons on the other hand, submitted that the High Court had rightly taken the view that the requirements of Section 142 were not met. It was pointed out that the effect of the first notice was lost in view of the fact that the second notice was given. The High Court has rightly applied the ratio in Sadanandan Bhadran’s case (supra). It is not in dispute that there was issuance and receipt of the lawyer’s notices on both the occasions. In fact, the acknowledgement of service of first notice has been filed by the complainant-appellant himself and at all stages the case proceeded on the footing that the first notice had been issued and served. The High Court has categorically noted that the first notice had been ser



































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