Andhra Pradesh High Court
B.C.SHARMA - Appellant
Versus
BHAGWATI ENTERPRISES - RESPONDENT
Decided On: 09-27-99
The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr. P. C. can be exercised to quash proceedings even when a second revision is barred under Section 397(3) Cr. P. C., but only in cases where there is grave miscarriage of justice, abuse of the process of the courts, failure to comply with statutory procedure, or failure of justice.
Headnote:
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE - SECTION 482 - INHERENT JURISDICTION - SCOPE AND POWER OF THE HIGH COURT - EXERCISE OF INHERENT JURISDICTION - CONDITIONS PRECEDENT.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner, a former director of a company, was accused of issuing a cheque on behalf of the company after he had resigned from his position. The petitioner filed a petition under Section 482 Cr. P. C. to quash the proceedings against him, arguing that he had no concern with the company at the time the cheque was issued.
Finding of the Court:
The court held that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr. P. C. is to be exercised for either of the purposes specified therein and the remedy thereunder is not to be resorted to like the remedy of appeal or revision. It is also manifestly clear that where the glaring illegality or injustice stares the court in the face, then the bar created by sub-Section (3) of Section 397 of the Code cannot limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482.
Issues: 1. Whether the High Court can exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr. P. C. to quash proceedings when a second revision is barred under Section 397(3) Cr. P. C.? 2. Whether the petitioner had resigned from the directorship of the company at the time the cheque was issued?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The High Court can exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr. P. C. to quash proceedings when a second revision is barred under Section 397(3) Cr. P. C., but only in cases where there is grave miscarriage of justice, abuse of the process of the courts, failure to comply with statutory procedure, or failure of justice. 2. The question of whether the petitioner had resigned from the directorship of the company at the time the cheque was issued is a disputed question of fact that must be decided at trial.
Final Decision: The petition was dismissed.
( 1 ) THE respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner and others in the court of the Metropolitan Magistrate Delhi on 29. 7. 1995 alleging commission of offence under Sections 138/141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act by them. The Metropolitan Magistrate took cognizance upon the complaint and issued processes against the persons arraigned. Aggrieved thereby the petitioner moved the trial Court for dropping proceedings initiated against him on the ground that on 19. 1. 1991 he had resigned from the post of Director of the company and had no concern with the company on the date of issue of the offending cheque i. e. on 2. 6. 95. By the order dated 28. 10. 97, the Metropolitan Magistrate dismissed the application filed by the petitioner. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner moved the Additional Sessions Judge by filing a revision, which was also dismissed vide orders dated 12. 8. 1998 passed in Crl. Revision No. 137/97. Not satisfied with the dismissal of the revision, the petitioner has come up before this court under Section 482 Cr. P. C.
( 2 ) LEARNED counsel for the respondent has raised a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the petition filed under Section 482 Cr. P. C. According to the learned counsel sub- Section (3) of Section 397 Cr. P. C. bars the second revision and this court cannot act as second revisional court under the garb of exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr. P. C. Reliance is placed on the decisions of the Apex Court in G. M. Hegde vs. S. Bangarappa (1995) 2 All Cri. L. R. 211 and Dharampal and others Vs. Smt. Ramshri and others (AIR 1993 SC 1361), Deepti Vs. Akhil Rai and Others 1995 S. C. C. (Cr) 1020 and decisions of this Court in K. T. Zimik Vs. Government of N. C. T. Delhi 1999 (iii) AD (Crl.) D. H. C. 341 (1993) D. L. T. 267. As against the said authorities, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Jitendra Kumar Jain Vs. State of Delhi (1998) 8 SCC 770, which lays down that although a second revision petition does not lie before the High Court when one is dismissed by the court of Session, still the proceedings of the court of Session are open to scrutiny by the High Court in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 Cr. P. C.
( 3 ) IN Krishan and Another Vs. Krishnaveni and Another J. T. 1997 (1) S. C. 657, the Apex Court had occasion to consider the question : whether in view of the bar of second revision under sub-Section (3) of Section 397 Cr. P. C. , inherent power of the High Court is still available under Section 482 Cr. P. C. ? Explaining the scope and power of the High Court under Section 482 Cr. P. C. , their Lordships have observed as under :-
"ordinarily, when revision has been barred by Section 397 (3) of the Code, a person - accused/complainant - cannot be allowed to take recourse to the revision to the High Court under Section 397 (1) or under inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code since it may amount to circumvention of the provisions of Section 397 (3) or section 397 (2) of the Code. It is seen that the High Court has suo motu power under Section 401 and continuous supervisory jurisdiction under Section 483 of the Code. So, when the High Court on examination of the record finds that there is grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of the courts or the required statutory procedure has not been compiled with or there is failure of justice or order passed or sentence imposed by the Magistrate requires correction, it is but the duty of the High Court to have it corrected at the inception lest grave miscarriage of justice would ensue. It is, therefore, to meet the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process that the High Court is preserved with inherent power and would be justified under such circumstances, to exercise the inherent power and in an appropriate case even revisional power under Section 397 (1) read with Secti