Advocates:
Counel for the Parties:
For the Petitioner:R.V. Bhasin, Advocate.
For the the Respondent No. 1: V.B. Konde Deshmukh, APP.
For the Respondent No. 2:D.A. Shinde, Advocate.

Certainly. Based on the provided legal document, here are the key points:

1. The term "bank" in Section 138(a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act refers specifically to the drawee bank on which the cheque is drawn, not the bank where the cheque is presented for collection (!) (!) .

2. The limitation period for filing a complaint under Section 138(b) begins from the date the payee or holder in due course receives information from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid, rather than from the date the cheque return memo is issued by the drawee bank (!) (!) (!) .

3. The expression "in 30 days of the receipt of information by the bank" does not mean the date of receipt of the cheque return memo by the payee’s bank or the payee directly. Instead, it refers to the date when the payee or holder in due course receives actual information from the bank regarding the cheque's dishonour (!) (!) .

4. In the specific case discussed, the limitation period started from the date the petitioner personally inquired at his bank and was informed about the dishonour, which was 30-4-2001, rather than the date of issuing the cheque return memo (!) .

5. The cause of action arises when the payee or holder in due course receives information from the bank about the dishonour and the drawer fails to make payment within the prescribed period. In this case, that date was 2-6-2001 (!) .

6. The complaint filed on 28-6-2001 was within the permissible limitation period, considering the limitation starts from the date of receipt of information about the dishonour, not from the cheque return memo issuance date (!) .

7. The interpretation of "the bank" in the context of Section 138(b) is different from that in Section 138(a). For Clause (b), "the bank" refers to the bank that provides information regarding the dishonour, which is not necessarily the drawee bank (!) (!) .

8. The court dismissed the petition, holding that the complaint was filed within the statutory limitation period and that the interpretation of the limitation period should be based on when the payee or holder in due course receives the relevant information from the bank (!) (!) .

These points summarize the core legal principles and factual findings relevant to the case regarding the interpretation of "bank" and the commencement of limitation under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.