A.L. Dave, J.—Hear Mr. Gondalia, learned Advocate for Mr. Lakhani, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, Mr. Nanavati for respondent No. 2 and Mr. Dave, learned APP for respondent No.1.

2. Rule Mr. Nanavati and Mr. Dave waive service of Rule.

3. The petitioner here in had issued a cheque to respondent No. 2 for Rs. 17,000/- on 15.10.1991 drawn on Junagadh District Cooperative Bank, Marketing Yard, Junagadh. The said cheque was deposited on 23rd November, 1991 which was dishonoured by the Bank with an endorsement of insufficient fund. The respondent, therefore, issued a notice to the petitioner under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Thereafter, the said cheque was again deposited on 25th March, 1992 and it was returned with an endorsement of insufficiency of funds, pursuant to which, a notice again came to be issued as envisaged under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act on 8.4.1992, which was received by the petitioner on 20th April, 1992 and because he did not respond to the notice, respondent No.2 lodged a complaint in question on 8.5.1992.

4. With the above undisputed facts in the backdrop, the main and only argument advanced by the petitioner is that the cause of action arose on bouncing of cheque and issuance of notice thereafter, and, therefore, the complaint is time-barred. The second deposit and second issuance of the notice cannot extend period of limitation. In support of this argument, the reliance is placed on a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sadanandan Bhadran v. Madhuwan Sunilkumar, 1998 `(2) GLH 837=VII (1998) SLT 157=III (1998) CCR (SC)=I (1999) BC 691 (SC).

5. Mr. Nanavati has opposed this petition mainly on the ground that the conduct of the petitioner is unfair to the complaint. He, instead of preferring this petition, the petitioner could have raised this objection before the learned JMFC and if the learned JMFC, ultimately does not accept this legal proposition, then the petitioner could have come here.

6. Bearing this, respondent No. 2 is not able to meet with legal proposition advanced by the petitioner. Instead of entering into the technicalities of asking the petitioner to go to the Magistrate and to raise this objection, when the petitioner is before this Court and has raised this legal plea, benefit of which he is entitled to, this appears to be a fit case where, the petition deserves to be entertained.

7. It is categorically held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sadanandan Bhadran (supra), that the provisions contained in Sections 138 and 142 can be harmonised with the interpretation that on each presentation of the cheque and its dishonour, a fresh right and no cause of action accrues in favour of the complainant. This being so, the present complaint is time-barred and not entertainable. Under these circumstances, the petition deserves to be allowed. The complaint and the order passed by the learned Magistrate, Keshod are hereby quashed and set aside. However, it is clarified that this order may not be taken to take away the right of respondent No.2 for recovery of the amount in accordance with law. Rule is made absolute.