MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
HON'BLE S.S. SARAF, J.
M. Cri C. No. 5372 of 2001
Decided on 1.10.2001
BHIWANI DENIM & APPARELS LTD. & ORS.
Versus
BHASKAR INDU LTD.
The liability of individuals as directors and officers of a company under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act should be determined by the trial court, and quashing criminal proceedings at an early stage may not be justified.
Headnote:
Negotiable Instruments Act - Criminal Proceedings - Section 138, Section 239, Section 258
Fact of the Case:
The petitioners, directors and officers of a company, filed applications under Section 239 and 258 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash criminal proceedings against them for bounced cheques. The lower courts dismissed the applications, leading to the present petitions invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the Court.
Finding of the Court:
The Court found that the provisions of Section 239 and 258 of the Criminal Procedure Code did not apply to the present summons cases against the petitioners. It also held that the liability of the petitioners under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act should be decided by the trial court, and quashing the proceedings at this stage was not justified.
Issues: The issues revolved around the applicability of Section 239 and 258 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and the liability of the petitioners under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court's decision was based on the interpretation of the relevant legal provisions, specifically Section 239, 258 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. It emphasized that the liability of the petitioners should be determined by the trial court, and the petitioners should have the opportunity to present their contentions before the framing of charges.
Final Decision: The Court dismissed all the petitions, allowing the petitioners to present their contentions before the trial court before the framing of charges.
This order shall also govern the disposal of Miscellaneous Criminal Cases Nos. 5369/2001, 5370/2001, 5371/2001, 5372/2001, 5373/2001-, 5374/2001, 5375/2001, 5376/2001, 5377/2001, 5378/2001, 5379/2001 and 5380/2001.
2. These twelve petitions have been directed under Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the order dated 29.8.2001 passed by the learned Vlth Additional Sessions Judge, Bhopal affirming the order dated 15.5.2001 passed by Smt. Joyti Vinodiya, learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bhopal. Where by the applications filed under Section 239 and 258, Code of Criminal Procedure in each of the cases by the petitioners have been dismissed.
3. The facts giving rise to these petitions are these:-
On the basis of complaints filed by the respondent No.l, cases for offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short the `Act') have been registered against the petitioners. In each of the cases, it has been contended that the chques issued on behalf of the petitioner No.l .Company and signed by the petitioner No.2 have been bounced. The petitioners Nos. 3 to 13 are Directors while the petitioner No.14 is Secretary and General Manager, Procurement and Public Relation of the Company (Petitioner No.l). Notices were served on the petitioners by the respondent No.l as per provisions of the Act and the steps as per provisions of the Act have also been taken by the respondent No.l but no payments have yet been made by the petitioners.
4. The petitioner have filed applications each of the criminal cases pending against them under Section. 239 and 258, Criminal Procedure Code. The learned Magistrate rejected applications. The revision petitions having been filed against the order passed by the learned Magistrate in each of the criminal cases pending against, the petitioners, have also been dismissed by the learned Vlth Additional Sessions Judge, Bhopal by the impugned orders dated 29.8.2001. The petitioners have, therefore filed present petitions invoking inherent jurisdiction of this Court. The learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that he does not press the petition on behalf of petitioners Nos. 1 and 2.
5. Having heard the learned counsel for both the sides and having perused the material on record, I am of the considered view that all these petitions deserve to be dismissed. Before proceeding further, It shall be useful to quote the provisions of Section 239 and 258 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which run as under:-
"239. When accused shall discharged,- If, upon considering the police report and the documents sent with it under Section 173 and making such examination, if any, of he accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused, and record his reasons for so doing."
"258. Power to stop proceedings in certain cases.- In any summons case instituted otherwise than upon complaint, a Magistrate of the first class, or, with the previous sanction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, any other Judicial Magistrate, may, for reasons to be recorded by him, stop the proceedings at any stage without pronouncing any judgement and where such stoppage or proceedings is made after the evidence of the principal witnesses has been recorded, pronounce a judgement of acquittal and, in any other case, release the accused, and such release shall have the effect of discharge."
6. A mere reading of Section 239 of Criminal procedure Code indicated that the provisions of the section are applicable for the trail of warrant cases by Magistrates. Undisputedly the criminal cases registered against the petitioners are summons cases and therefore the provisions of Section 239 Criminal Procedure Code do not attract in the present cases pending against the petitioners. It is also clear from the perusal of section 258, Criminal Proced