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2007 (2) Bankmann 194
KERALA HIGH COURT
R. Basant, J.
Sathyan Ayyappa Sathyan —Petitioner
versus
Yousu and Another —Respondents
Crl. Revision Petn. No. 3394 of 2006
Decided on 27-9-2006
Held: When it comes to Section 357(3) of the Cr.P.C., the Court is invested with powers to direct the accused person to pay, by way of compensation, such amount as may be specified to the person who has suffered any loss or injury by reason of the act for which the accused person has been so sentenced. Though Section 357(3) of the Cr.P.C. does not repeat the heads under which the amounts can be directed to be paid as compensation, the conclusion appears to me to be inevitable that all such payments which are contemplated under Clauses (a) to (d) of Section 357(1) of the Cr.P.C. can also be directed to be paid when it comes to issue of a direction under Section 357(3) of the Cr.P.C. Clauses (a) to (d) deal with various losses which may be suffered by a victim of the crime and the general words employed in Section 357(3) must certainly take in all the amounts which are enumerated as payable under Clauses (a) to (d) of Section 357(1) of the Cr.P.C. (Para 10)
The expression “such amount as may be specified” appearing in Section 357(3) of the Cr.P.C. cannot certainly suggest or convey that direction for payment of interest at the specified rate on a specified amount will cease to be an amount “as may be specified” for the purpose of Section 357(3) of the Cr.P.C. That would continue to be an amount specified, though the amount payable as such in figures is not specified and only the basis on which such amount is to be ascertained is specified. There is no uncertainty whatsoever in the impugned direction. The amount due on any given date can be ascertained specifically. Therefore, the said expression such amount as may be specified appearing in Section 357(3) of the Cr.P.C. cannot lead the Court to the conclusion that a direction to pay interest is impermissible. (Para 12)
The conclusion is thus inevitable from fundamental concepts that interest is nothing but compensation payable for amounts retained unjustifiably without payment. In that view of the matter also interest is compensation and direction can be issued under Section 357(3) of the Cr.P.C. for payment of interest. (Para 19)
We now come to the next question as to the rate at which such interest can be directed to be paid. Merely because interest at the rate of 18% per annum can be claimed under Section 80, it is not essential that a Court much less a criminal Court which need only ensure just compensation should direct payment at that rate. When the matter goes to a civil Court, for the pre-litigation period interest at the rate specified in Section 80 may be payable. But that does not necessarily oblige the criminal Court to direct payment of interest at the full rate of interest mentioned in Section 80. The Court can ascertain the loss which the complainant would suffer/has suffered on account of the delay in payment and appropriate rate of interest can be directed to be paid, conscious of the stipulation under Section 80. Consistent with the rate of interest payable by the nationalized banks. I am satisfied that a direction for payment of interest at the rate of 8% per annum shall serve the ends of justice eminently. (Para 21)
Result: Revision disposed of.
R. Basant, J.—Does the criminal Court have the power to direct payment of interest on the amount of compensation directed to be paid under Section 357(3) of the Cr. P.C.? This interesting question arises for consideration in this revision petition which is directed in this revision petition which is directed against a concurrent verdict of guilty, conviction and sentence in a prosecution under Section 138 of the N.I. Act.
2. The cheque is for an amount of
Rs. 25,000/- and bears the date 01.11.2004. Signature in the cheque is admitted. Notice of demand succeeded in evoking only Ext. D1 reply notice. No payment was made. The complainant examined himself as PW1 and proved Exts. P1 to P5. The accused did not adduce any oral evidence. He proved Exts. D1 and D2. The accused raised a plea that the cheque was not issued for the due discharge of any legally enforceable debt/liability; but was issued only as security in a transaction between the wife of the accused and the complainant.
3. The Courts below concurrently came to the conclusion that the complainant has succeeded in establishing all ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. Accordingly they proceeded to pass the impugned concurrent judgments. The petitioner faces the sentence of imprisonment till rising of Court. There is a further direction under Section 357(3) of the Cr.P.C. to pay an amount of Rs. 25,000 along with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from 01.11.2004—the date of the cheque.
4. Called upon to explain the nature of challenge which the petitioner wants to mount against the impugned concurrent judgments, the learned counsel for the petitioner does not strain to assail the verdict of guilty and conviction. I am satisfied that the stand taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner is an informed and fair one. I find the verdict of guilty and conviction to be absolutely justified and unexceptionable.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner raises two contentions. Firstly, it is contended that the sentence imposed is excessive. Secondly, it is contended that powers under Section 357(3). Cr.P.C. do not justify a direction to recover interest on the principal amount of compensation. The counsel contended that the power of the Court under Section 357(3), Cr.P.C. is only to direct payment of a specific amount and there can be no direction for payment on any interest on such specific amount directed to be paid.
6. I find merit in the prayer for leniency. I have already adverted to the principles governing imposition of sentence in a prosecution under Section 138 of the N.I. Act in the decision reported in Anil Kumar v. Shammy [2002 (3) KLT 852]. I am not satisfied that there are any compelling circumstances available in this case which would justify the imposition of any deterrent substantive sentence of imprisonment on the petitioner. Leniency can be shown on the question of sentence. But at the same time the Courts cannot ignore the plight of the respondent/complainant who has been compelled to fight three rounds of legal battle and to wait from 2004 for the redressal of his genuine grievance.
7. The interesting legal question that has been raised is whether a direction can be issued under Section 357(3) of the Cr.P.C. to pay as compensation interest on the amount shown in the cheque. The Courts below have directed payment of the principal amount due under the cheque i.e. Rs. 25,000/- along with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from 01.11.2004 till the date of realization. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that such a direction is legally impermissible and unacceptable.
8. The question raised is interesting. The learned counsel were requested to research and make detailed submissions. I place on record my appreciation of the assistance rendered by Mr. V.N. Shankerjee, the young counsel who was requested to assist this Court as amicus curiae.
9. The first question raised is whether all amounts which can be direc
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