2008(2) Bankmann 493 (Bom.)
BOMBAY HIGH COURT
A.P. Lavande, J.
Shriniwas —Applicant
versus
Akola Janata Commercial Co-operative
Bank Ltd. and Anr. —Respondents
Criminal Application Nos. 601 to 612 of 2008
Decided on 6.5.2008
Held: Sub-section (1) of Section 143 of the Act provides that all offences under this chapter shall be tried by a Judicial Magistrate of the first class or by a Metropolitan Magistrate and the provisions of Sections 262 and 265 of the Code shall, as far as applies to such trials. Sections 262 to 265 of the Code are to be found in Chapter XXI of the Code which deals with summary trials. First proviso to Section 143 of the Act permits the Magistrate to pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year and an amount of fine exceeding five thousand rupees. The second proviso to Section 143 of the Act gives discretion to the Magistrate to recall any witness who may have been examined and proceed to hear or re-hear the case in the manner provided by the said Code. Sub-section (2) of the Act provides that the trial of a case shall be held from day to day and consistently with the interest of justice. Sub-section (3) of the Act provides that every trial shall be conducted as expeditiously as possible and an endeavour should be made to conclude the trial within six months from the date of filing of the complaint.
From a bare reading of Section 143 of the Act, it is evident that it is the intention of the legislature that ordinarily offences under Chapter of the Act should be tried in summary way and it is only in a case where sentence of more than one year may have to pass or for any other reason, it is undesirable to try the case summarily that the Magistrate can proceed to recall the witness already examined and further proceed to re-hear the case.
When a case alleging commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act is filed in view of Section 143(1) of the Act the Magistrate has to register it as a summary case. One of the grounds on which the Magistrate may decide not to try a case summarily is that the sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding one year may have to be passed. Obviously, the Magistrate can hold so only after recording of some evidence led by the complainant. Even before the evidence is led by the complainant, it would be premature for the Magistrate to come to the conclusion that a sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding one year will have to be passed. (Paras 11 to 13)
As stated above, in the absence of any provision under the Code the applicant could not have filed applications stating therein the grounds on which the cases should not be tried as summary cases. In a summons case after the accused is summoned, the case starts with the Magistrate explaining the substance of accusation to the accused under Section 251 of the Code. There is no provision under Chapter XX of the Code, which permits filing of an application stating the grounds on which the accused wants the case not to be tried as summons case. On this ground alone, the application filed by the applicant was liable to be rejected. (Para 17)
Result: Applications dismissed.
A.P. Lavande, J.—Heard Mr. Lohiya, learned counsel for the applicant, Mr. R.L. Khapre, learned counsel for respondent No.1 and Mrs. Wandile, learned A.P.P. for respondent No. 2 in all the applications.
2. Rule. By consent heard forthwith.
3. All these applications under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are being disposed of by common judgment since the facts as well as question of law involved are identical.
4. Respondent No.1 in all these applications filed Summary Criminal Case Nos. 6650/2003, 2548/2003, 4418/2003, 6651/2003, 9052/2003, 3105/2003, 4419/2003, 6652/2003, 3426/2003, 6649/2003, 2549/2003, 4417/2003, and 9051/2003 against the present applicant alleging commission of offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) since the cheques issued by the applicant were dishonoured. After issuance of process, the applicant filed separate applications in each of Criminal Case purporting to be under Section 259 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”) read with Section 143 of the Act. By these applications, the applicant accused prayed that the cases be tried as warrant cases on the following grounds:
(i) The applicant disputes the amount mentioned in the cheques;
(ii) Several witnesses may be required to be examined by the bank to prove the liability and the accused may be required to cross-examine the witnesses at length;
(iii) The complaint was not filed by authorised person nor Section138 of the Act was complied with;
(iv) The bank had started proceedings under Securitization Act against the applicant and the same was pending for adjudication; and
(v) The matter is contested and complicated.
5. The applications were opposed by the respondent No. 1/complainant by filing replies and by common order dated 12.4.2007 all the applications were rejected. The learned Magistrate held that the applicant had not made out any case for trying the cases as warrant cases and consequently dismissed the applications. As against the said common order, the applicant preferred Criminal Revision Applications bearing Nos.101 of 2007 to 112 of 2007 which were also dismissed by common judgment and order dated 30.11.2007.
6. Mr. Lohiya, learned counsel for the applicant reiterated the same grounds urged before the learned Magistrate as well as Revisional Court and submitted that having regard to several factors, which were mentioned in the applications filed by the applicant, the learned Magistrate ought to have converted summary case into warrant case and, therefore, both the orders passed by the learned Magistrate as well as Revisional Court are liable to be quashed and set aside. According to Mr. Lohiya, since the amount involved in each case is quite substantial and complicated issues are likely to arise during the trials, serious prejudice would be caused to the applicant in case the cases are tried as summary criminal cases and not as warrant cases. In support of his submissions, Mr. Lohiya placed reliance upon second proviso to Section 143 of the Act. He, therefore, submitted that both the impugned orders be quashed and set aside and the learned Magistrate be directed to try the cases as warrant cases.
7. Per contra, Mr. Khapre, learned counsel placing reliance upon Section 143 of the Act submitted that there is no illegality or perversity in the impugned orders and the reasons given by both the Courts below for dismissing the applications filed by the applicant cannot be said to be illegal or perverse warranting inference in exercise of inherent jurisdiction by this Court. Mr. Khapre placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Shivaji Sampat Jagtap v. Rajan Hiralal Arora1 and judgment of M.P. High Court in M/s Steel Tubes of India v. M/s Steel Authority of India.2
8. Mrs. Wandile, learned A.P.P. supported the impugned judgment and order.
9. Mr. Lohiya submitted that the Madhya Pradesh High Court in M/s Steel Tubes of
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