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2009(2) Bankmann 129 (Mad.)
MADRAS HIGH COURT
S. Palanivelu, J.
Rajan K. Moorthy –Petitioner
versus
M. Vijayan –Respondent
Criminal Revision No.1398 of 2006
Decided on 10.10.2007
Counsel for the Parties:
For the Petitioner:Mr. S. Anand, Advocate.
For the Respondent:Mr. K. Veeraraghavan, Advocate.
IMPORTANT POINT
Under Section 147 of the NI Act the parties are at liberty to compound the offence at any stage even after dismissal of the revision application.
Headnote:(i) Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881—Section 138—Cheque dishonoured—Section 142—Trial Court convicted accused.
(ii) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973—Section 374—Appeal dismissed—Section 397/401—Revision against dismissal—Held: A compromise under Section 147 of the NI Act is filed as of the parties’ right. Revision is allowed. Impugned judgment set aside. Petitioner acquitted of the charge(s). (Paras 3, 10 and 15)
S. Palanivelu, J.—This revision has been filed against the judgment, dated 22.11.2006, passed in Criminal Appeal No.61 of 2006 on the file of Additional Sessions Court (FTC No. II), Kancheepuram, as against the judgment, dated 20.4.2006, made in C.C. No. 36 of 2005, on the file of Judicial Magistrate Court No.1, Kancheepuram.
2. Petitioner is the accused in the calendar case, which was taken on file on the basis of a complaint lodged by the respondent, on the strength of dishonour of a cheque, allegedly delivered by the petitioner to the respondent. The said case went against the petitioner in the Judicial Magistrate Court No.1, Kancheepuram, which, the petitioner carried in appeal before the Additional Sessions Court (Fast Track Court No. II), Kancheepuram, before which Court also, the same result came to be recorded. Aggrieved over the said judgment of the appellate Court, the petitioner has preferred this revision before this Court.
3. Pending revision, the petitioner has produced a compromise memo, duly signed by himself and the respondent/complainant as well as their respective counsel on record, stating that the matter has been compromised between the parties and the respondent is prepared to withdraw the complaint filed by him and that he is not pressing for conviction of the petitioner.
4. Since the matter has been settled between the parties, they seek permission of this Court to compound the offence and to allow the revision, in view of the subsequent development in the case.
5. At this juncture, the question which arises for consideration, is, whether the Court can entertain such a request to compound the offence in revisional stage?
6. Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act runs as, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), every offence punishable under this Act shall be compoundable. The Section starts with a non-obstante clause, which will have the legal effect of prevail over any provisions in any other statutes, which are in vogue.
7. By means of introduction of the said section, the legislature has enabled the parties to a case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, to enter into a compromise.
8. At this stage, the scheme of Section 320, Cr.P.C. has to be looked into. Section 320(1) enumerates the offences under I.P.C., which are made compoundable by the persons mentioned therein. Section 320(2) contemplates such compounding with the permission of the Court.
9. Pertinent it is to state that Section 320(6) Cr.P.C. confers powers upon High Court and Sessions Court acting in the exercise of its powers or revision under Section 401 to allow any person to compound any offence which such person is competent to compound under this Section.
10. It is to be seen, whether Section 320 Cr.P.C. would have any effect on Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The answer will be in the negative, the reason being the Negotiable Instruments Act is a special statute, which has overriding effect to prevail over the provisions of general law. Section 320 Cr.P.C. describes the compoundable and non-compoundable cases with or without the permission of the Court, which are given in the Indian Penal Code and, certainly, the said Section would have no impact on Section 147 of the Act. The term “special law” denotes the law enacted for dealing with specific clause of offences, while general law would govern the procedures dealing with offences under general law.
11. Section 41, I.P.C. defines a special law as a law applicable to a particular subject. While discussing about the compass of the term “special law”, the Apex Court observed in Kaushalaya Rani v. Gopal Singh1 that the expressions ‘general law’ and ‘special law’ are relative terms and referred to a particular subject dealt with by respective act so that it is not possible logically to label any set of laws as being general laws or special law. Hence, the net result is, Section 147 of the Act will
