A.N. Venugopala Gowda, J.—In the present case, the Trial Court convicted the petitioners/accused, in a case related to the dishonour of a cheque under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, ‘the Act’). The petitioners/accused were sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 6,10,000, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year. The complainant was held entitled for compensation of Rs. 6,05,000, in case of payment of fine by the accused. In appeal filed by the accused, the said finding was confirmed. Assailing the said judgment of conviction and order of sentence, as affirmed in the appeal, the accused have filed this criminal revision petition.

2. Sri S. Subramanya, learned Advocate for the petitioners contended that the learned Appellate Judge has erred in law in taking the arguments as heard on 21.4.2010, though he has noted in the order sheet, as to the absence of both the parties before the Court. He submitted that the appellants were not provided with reasonable opportunity to address the arguments on merits of the case. By placing reliance on the decision in the case of Md. Sukur Ali v. State of Assam1, he submitted that, criminal case cannot be decided against the accused in the absence of Counsel. He further submitted that, in the facts and circumstances of the case and in the interests of Justice, interference with the impugned judgment of the Appellate Court is warranted.

3. Sri M.V. Manjunatha, learned Advocate for the respondent, on the other hand submitted that the absence of the appellants and their learned Advocate on 21.4.2010 was deliberate and hence, the learned Appellate Judge was justified in perusing the record of the case and in deciding the appeal on its merit. Learned Counsel sought dismissal of the petition.

4. Perused the record of the case. In the light of the rival contentions, the short point for consideration is:

“Whether there is denial of reasonable opportunity of hearing by the learned Appellate Judge and whether the judgment passed on the appeal is vitiated?”

5. Petitioners, who stood trial, were convicted in C.C. No. 14104 of 2007, on 14.10.2009, by the XXII Addl. CMM, Bangalore, for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act and they were sentenced to pay fine, with default stipulation. Criminal Appeal No. 861 of 2009 was filed on 13.11.2009, assailing the said judgment of conviction and the order of sentence. On 16.11.2009, while ordering the issuance of notice to the respondent/complainant, the sentence imposed on the accused was suspended, subject to certain conditions. The Trial Court record was subsequently called for and was received on 6.4.2010. Appeal was posted on 21.4.2010 for hearing the arguments. Advocates appearing for the appellants and also the respondent, did not appear. Argument was taken as heard and the appeal was dismissed on 27.4.2010.

6. In identical circumstances, in the case of N. Nagaraju v. G.R. Gumaste, Cri. R.P. No. 1127 of 2011, decided on 5.10.2012, it was held by me as follows:

“6. The appeal being against the judgment of conviction, the appellate Court ought to have granted reasonable time for the appellant to make alternate arrangement in case the Counsel on record is not available or the Court itself ought to have appointed an amicus curiae, heard the appeal and decided the same. Instead, the matter was posted to 12.8.2011 and it was taken that, sufficient time was granted to the appellant and arguments was not advanced. The sequence of events noticed supra would indicate that reasonable opportunity of hearing has not been provided to the appellant. The ratio of decision in Khaili and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1981 Supp. SCC 75 has not been followed. In the circumstances, the judgment passed by the Appellate Judge is vitiated and warrants interference”.

7. In the case of Md. Sukur Ali, the question considered by the Apex Court was, whether, in a criminal case, if the Counsel for the accused does