IMPORTANT POINT
Bahi entries are not negotiable instruments of advancement of loan.

Mehinder Singh Sullar, J.—The matrix of the facts & evidence, unfolded during the course of trial, which needs a necessary mention for the limited purpose of deciding the core controversy, involved in the instant petition for leave to appeal and emanating from the record, is that initially, petitioner-complainant Narsi Dass s/o Kartar Singh (for brevity ‘the complainant’), who was running a shop of commission agent, styled as M/s Ompal Satish Kumar, has instituted a criminal complaint, in which, respondent Surender s/o Chanda Ram was summoned to face the trial for the commission of an offence punishable u/s.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter to be referred as “the NI Act”) by the trial Court.

2. The case set up by the complainant, in brief in so far as relevant, was that the respondent was a Farmer at the relevant time. He used to borrow money from him for agricultural purpose with an understanding that he would repay the amount of loan along with interest at the rate of 24% per annum. At the same time, he had promised to sell his agricultural produce at the shop of complainant. Subsequently, he stopped doing so in the year 2010. Thereafter, the complainant requested the respondent to repay the amount borrowed by him along with interest. Instead of paying the loan amount, he had issued impugned cheque dated 16.5.2011 for Rs.1,50,000 drawn at Oriental Bank of Commerce, Nissing in his (complainant’s) favour in discharge of part of his liability. The cheque was presented for encashment, but it was returned unpaid with the remarks “Insufficient Funds”, vide memo dated 17.5.2011 by the bank. Thereafter, the statutory legal notice dated 23.5.2011 was served upon the respondent, by virtue of which, he was called upon to make the payment of the amount of impugned cheque within a stipulated period, but in vain. Then, the complainant filed a criminal complaint against the respondent in the manner depicted here-in-above.

3. Having completed the codal/statutory procedure of the trial and after closing the evidence by the complainant, the statement of the respondent was recorded. The entire incriminating material/evidence was put to enable him to explain any circumstance appearing against him on the record, as contemplated under Section 313 CrP.C. He has stoutly denied the entire evidence-of complainant in its totality and termed the pointed complaint as false.

4. Likewise, considering the entire oral as well as documentary evidence brought on record, the trial Court dismissed the complaint of complainant and acquitted the respondent from the indicated offence, by way of impugned judgment of acquittal dated 4.6.2014.

5. Aggrieved thereby, the complainant has preferred the present petition for leave to appeal to challenge the impugned judgment of acquittal, invoking the provisions of Section 378(4) Cr.P.C. That is how I am seized of the matter.

6. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, having gone through the evidence on record with his valuable assistance and after bestowal of thoughts over the entire matter, to my mind, there is no merit in the instant petition in this context.

7. At the very outset, it may be added here that the jurisdiction of the appellate Court in case of acquittal, was determined by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a celebrated judgment of Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., 2008(10) SCC 450. Having considering the scope of Sections 378, 386 Cr.P.C. and a line of various judgments on the point, it was ruled as under (para 75):

“75. In light of the above, the High Court and other appellate courts should follow the well settled principles crystallized by number of judgments if it is going to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court’s acquittal:

1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial courts acquittal if it has ‘very substantial and compelling reasons’ for doing so.

A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have ‘very substantial